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Introduction and Summary
As the title says, the topics of this thesis are voting, elections and terrorism.
While the four papers of the thesis are self-contained and each of them can be
read independently of the others, they are certainly related. Most importantly,
the papers all consist of formal models within the broadly dened eld of political
economy. The rst two papers both consider electoral competititon, a subject that
is obviously at the very core of political economy. In the third paper we study the
interaction between terrorists and authorities. The nal paper introduces a new
decision criterion in collective action situations and studies its implications in some
examples. With respect to methodology, the papers are naturally divided into two
sub-groups. The rst and the last paper both have a behavioral touch, i.e. they
both contain assumptions that deviate from the standard rationality paradigm in
the eld of economics. The models studied in the other two papers are completely
standard in that sense. This aspect of the thesis reects my personal view that
both behavioral and standard models can help us understand economic, political,
and, more generally, social phenomena.
In the following we will give a summary of each of the four papers. We will not
specically relate them to the existing literature, for that we refer to the papers.
In the rst paper, Projection E¤ects and Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Com-
petition, we suggest a new explanation of ambiguous issue positions in electoral
competition. It is based on the psychological concept of cognitive consistency. In
this context cognitive consistency implies that voters prefer to believe that they
agree with political candidates they like for personal reasons and vice versa. There-
fore a voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive his position as closer to
(further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. Suppose voters
perceptions are not counterfactual, i.e. certain positions are perceived correctly,
and that voting is based on perceived issue positions. Then projection gives a can-
didate who is generally liked (for personal reasons) by the electorate an incentive
to be ambiguous. We construct and analyze a formal model to see if this incentive
survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition. The model is an extension
of the standard Downsian model. We make sure that all results predicting ambi-
guity are solely driven by projection by assuming that voters dislike ambiguity per
se, i.e. if there were no projection e¤ects. Our rst results show that the median
voter theorem breaks down under quite mild assumptions. Loosely speaking, if a
candidate is liked by a few voters and not disliked by too many then he can defeat
an opponent positioned at the median by taking an ambiguous position. While
this certainly shows that our introduction of projection e¤ects into the standard
model of electoral competition does make a di¤erence, it is not enough to predict
ambiguity. For that we should have ambiguity in equilibrium. Consider the case
where a candidate is liked by a majority and not disliked by any voters while his
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opponent is not liked by any voters. Ambiguity is then predicted if the advantaged
candidate has an ambiguous position that is a winning strategy. We show that
this is the case if and only if projection is su¢ ciently strong. This means that
our model does not clearly predict ambiguity if the assimilation is relatively weak
(it does not have an equilibrium). While this is a drawback of the model, it is
also an interesting observation. It shows that a candidate with a large advantage
due to voters personal views of the candidates cannot necessarily make use that
advantage because of the strategic nature of electoral competition.
The second paper, Elections, Private Information, and State-Dependent Can-
didate Quality, contributes to the study of how democracy works under the reason-
able assumption that politicians are better informed than voters about conditions
relevant for policy choice. More specically, we consider a model of electoral com-
petition where both candidates and voters have private information but candidates
information is more accurate (they are fully informed). There are two states of
the world and each voters preferred policy is state-dependent. The candidates are
both purely o¢ ce-motivated but they are di¤erent with respect to state-dependent
quality. In one state one candidate has a quality advantage and in the other state
it is the other way around. This gives the disadvantaged candidate an incentive
not to reveal the true state. We solve the model for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
These can be classied as either revealing or non-revealing depending on whether
the voters can infer the true state from the candidatespolicy announcements or
not. Our rst results show that in revealing equilibria (satisfying a known rene-
ment criterion) there is convergence to the median of the true state and that a
revealing equilibrium exists if and only if votersinformation is su¢ ciently accu-
rate. So we conclude that if the electorate is su¢ ciently well informed then it is at
least a possibility that electoral competition works as if they were fully informed.
Our results on non-revealing equilibria show that many of these exist, some of
them independent of how well informed the voters are. The Intuitive Criterion
does not eliminate any of these equilibria. Therefore we impose a monotonicity
condition on votersbeliefs. With this condition we get that in any non-revealing
equilibrium the candidates diverge and that a non-revealing equilibrium exists if
and only if voters are not too well informed. The results on non-revealing equilibria
show that we can have policy divergence in equilibrium even though candidates are
purely o¢ ce-motivated. This is because of the state-dependent candidate quality
(and the assumptions on information). To our knowledge this is a new possible
expanation of policy divergence in electoral competition.
In the third paper of the thesis, Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copy-
cat E¤ect, the primary aim is to study the dynamic interaction of terrorists and
anti-terrorism authorities when a so called copycat e¤ect exists. We assume that
terrorist cells live for one period only and that their only decision is whether to
plan a small or a large attack. Planning a large attack involves a higher risk of
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being rolled up by the authorities before the attack. Our rst observation is that
an increase in the level of anti-terrorism makes it more likely that a cell will plan
a small rather than a large attack. Furthermore, we see that an increase in anti-
terrorism can make a terrorist attack more likely. We introduce a copycat e¤ect
by assuming that in each period there is a higher probability of a new cell being
formed if there was a large attack in the previous period. Solving the problem
of optimal anti-terrorism we see that the copycat e¤ect rationalizes an increase
in the level of anti-terrorism after a large attack. We use this result to analyze
the dynamic pattern of terrorist attacks when a copycat e¤ect exists. Finally, we
consider the long run distributions of attacks, damage and anti-terrorism costs.
We show that in the long run the copyct e¤ect leads to more anti-terrorism, more
small attacks, and a higher sum of damage and costs. On the other hand it leads
to less large attacks and less damage.
The nal paper, Group Based Regret and Collective Action, introduces group
based regret minimization as a decision criterion in collective action situations.
If regret is group based then an individual feels regret after some outcome if she
and other members of the group of people with similar preferences could have
improved the outcome by acting di¤erently, i.e. given her (and all other people
with similar preferences) a higher payo¤. This is di¤erent from "rational regret",
where rational means that an individual only feels regret if she could personally
have changed the outcome. We analyze two specic collective action situations to
see how the outcomes change when people are group based regret minimizers rather
than payo¤maximizers or rational regret minimizers. The examples are voting in
large elections and provision of a binary (discrete) public good. The rst example
is analyzed from a simple decision theoretic perspective while the second example is
analyzed by game theory. In both examples we see that there is more contribution
when people are group based regret minimizers. Thus the assumptions that regret
is group based and that minimization of anticipated regret regret is an important
criterion in decision making has the potential to explain over-contribution (relative
to the prediction of standard theory) in collective action situations.
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Projection E¤ects and Strategic Ambiguity in
Electoral Competition.
Thomas Jensen
Department of Economics
University of Copenhagen
July 15, 2007
Abstract
Theories from psychology suggest that voters perceptions of political
positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candi-
dates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidates
position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called
projection. If votersperceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based
on perceived policy positions then projection gives a generally liked candi-
date an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we construct and analyze
a formal model to investigate under which conditions this incentive survives
in the strategic setting of electoral competition, even if voters dislike ambi-
guity per se.
Keywords: Electoral Competition, Ambiguity, Voter Perception, Cogni-
tive Consistency, Projection.
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1 Introduction
According to theories from psychology (see e.g. Granberg (1993), Krosnick (2002),
and references therein) people prefer to be in a state of cognitive consistency.
Therefore a voter prefers to believe that he agrees with political candidates he likes
(for non-policy related reasons) and disagrees with candidates he dislikes. One way
the voter can achieve this is by distorting his perceptions of the candidatespolicy
positions. He "pulls" the positions of liked candidates towards his own position and
"pushes" the positions of disliked candidates away from it. In general this is called
projection. More specically, positive projection ("pulling") is called assimilation
and negative projection ("pushing") is called contrast.
If we assume that voters cannot have counterfactual perceptions then projection
of a candidates policy position can only happen when the candidate is ambiguous.
So if projection e¤ects exist and voters vote based on perceived policy positions
then a generally liked candidate has an incentive to be ambiguous because of
assimilation. This paper investigates under which conditions this incentive survives
in the strategic setting of electoral competition.
We formulate and analyze an extension of the standard Downsian model that
allows candidates to take ambiguous policy positions and introduces projection
e¤ects in votersperceptions of such positions. Ambiguous positions are modelled
by intervals of policies. Each voter has an (exogenous) positive, neutral or neg-
ative non-policy related attitude towards each candidate. When we say that a
voter likes (dislikes) a candidate it simply means that he has a positive (negative)
attitude towards him. Votersperceptions of announced ambiguous positions are
represented by probability distributions. They use perceived expected utility to
decide on who to vote for. By assuming that voters are risk averse we get that
they dislike ambiguity per se, i.e. if there were no projection e¤ects. Thus any
result predicting ambiguity is driven only by projection (assimilation).
Our rst results answer the following question: Under which conditions can a
candidate defeat the median by being ambiguous, i.e. win the election by taking
an ambiguous position when the other candidates position is xed at the median?
Loosely speaking, we show that if a candidate is liked by some voters and not
disliked by too many then he can defeat the median. For example, a candidate who
is not disliked by any voters can defeat the median if he is liked by an arbitrarily
small group of voters.
Secondly, we consider the question of existence or non-existence of winning
strategies (which must be ambiguous) for a candidate with an advantage due to
voter attitudes and projection. Consider an advantaged candidate who is not
disliked by any voters and liked by a majority and a disadvantaged candidate
who is not liked by any voters. We show that the advantaged candidate has
winning strategies if the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong. So our model does
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predict ambiguity in equilibrium when projection is strong. When projection is not
su¢ ciently strong then the advantaged candidate does not have winning strategies
and the model does not have an equilibrium (not even in mixed strategies). So the
advantaged candidate may not be able to win the election for sure, it depends on
the strength of the assimilation e¤ect.
There is a large empirical literature on projection (see Granberg (1993) and
Krosnick (2002) for surveys). A lot of studies using cross-sectional data do pro-
duce evidence that is consistent with projection e¤ects. Krosnick (2002), however,
points out that usually it is also consistent with alternative hypotheses, most
notably policy based evaluation and persuation. A fairly recent study using cross-
sectional data is Merrill, Grofman and Adams (2001). Their ndings are consistent
with projection, but they also show that most of their evidence could be explained
by policy based evaluation (together with di¤erent interpretations of issue scales
among voters). Krosnick (2002) reviews a few panel data studies that carefully
seek to separate projection from policy based evaluation and persuation. They
do not nd compelling evidence of projection. He concludes that the existence of
projection has not yet been convincingly demonstrated and that further empirical
research is needed.
As mentioned above, we make the assumption that projection of political po-
sitions is based on exogenous non-policy related attitudes and that the voting
decision is policy based (given perceptions of positions). Thus we have a combina-
tion of projection and policy based evaluation and it seems hard to cast any verdict
on its validity given the existing empirical literature on projection. Furthermore,
the type of projection we consider is actually quite modest because we rule out
counterfactual perceptions. So unless a candidate is very ambiguous votersper-
ceptions of his position will not be too inaccurate. Therefore our model can still
be relevant even if votersperceptions are reasonably accurate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of related liter-
ature. In Section 3 we set up the model and present some examples of our general
model of projection of ambiguous policy positions. Section 4 contains our results
(all proofs are delegated to the Appendix). In Section 5 we discuss and conlude.
2 Related Literature
A number of theoretical models of ambiguity in electoral competition exist in the
literature. Zeckhauser (1969) and Fishburn (1972) both consider lotteries in social
choice with a discrete set of alternatives (Zeckhauser only considers sets with three
alternatives). They show that a lottery can never be a Condorcet winner.
Shepsle (1972) extends the standard Downsian model by forcing one of the
candidates (the challenger) to take a lottery position, i.e. a non-degenerate proba-
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bility distribution over positions. The voters are expected utility maximizers. The
main result is that if a majority of voters are risk loving on an interval containing
the median, then the challenger can beat an incumbent at the median by taking
a lottery position with mean equal to the median. However, both existence and
non-existence of a winning position for the challenger can occur.
Page (1976) is critical of Shepsles theory of ambiguity. He notes that the
prediction of ambiguity is not very strong because the challenger may not have
a winning strategy. Also he questions whether (a majority of) voters are really
risk loving. Furthermore he argues that lottery positions are not a good way of
modelling ambiguous political positions because candidates do not express their
positions in ways that can easily be perceived as objective probability distribu-
tions. Page also presents his own theory of political ambiguity called emphasis
allocation theory. He considers a multidimensional space of policy and valence
dimensions. Candidates choose which dimensions (issues) to emphasize and take
positions in these dimensions. They are vague/ambiguous on issues they do not
put any emphasis on. Voters evaluate a candidate by summing the utilities of the
candidates positions on the issues, weigthed by the candidates emphasis on each
issue. In an example it is shown that this leads to emphasis on consensus issues
and ambiguity on issues of conict, no matter what the risk preferences of the
voters are. In a footnote Page mentions that a possible di¤erent explanation of
ambiguity could be that it allows for projection (p. 748).
McKelvey (1980) generalizes the results of Zeckhauser (1969) and Fishburn
(1972) to continuous densities on Rn. Furthermore he looks at the e¤ect of in-
troducing exogenous non-zero levels of ambiguity in a special case of electoral
competition. He shows that it does not disrupt existing equilibria.
Glazer (1990) shows by some examples that risk loving voters are not necessary
to get ambiguity in equilibrium in a two candidate electoral game. If there is
uncertainty about the preferred policy of the candidates and the position of the
median voter then ambiguity (not specifying a position) can be the equilibrium
outcome of a model with simultaneous announcements. In a model with sequential
announcements there can be ambiguity in equilibrium because the rst mover does
not want to make the second mover more informed about the position of the median
voter.
Alesina and Cukierman (1990) considers a two period model. In the rst period
an incumbent decides on a policy. Before the second period elections are held and in
the second period the winner enacts his preferred policy (nal period play). Voters
are imperfectly informed about the incumbents preferred policy so they vote using
an estimate based on the rst period policy. Therefore the incumbent can have
an incentive to blur his policy preferences by being ambiguous, i.e. by choosing a
noisy policy instrument. For a non-empty set of parameter values (including risk
averse voters) it is optimal for the incumbent to choose a non-minimal level of
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ambiguity.
Aragones and Neeman (2000) analyze a two stage electoral game with two can-
didates. First the candidates simultaneously choose a point in the policy space
(an ideology) and the choices become common knowledge. Then they simultane-
ously choose their level of ambiguity. Candidates have a preference for winning
and for being ambiguous because it leaves them with more exibility in o¢ ce.
Voters dislike ambiguity so candidates face a trade o¤ between a high probability
of winning (there is uncertainty about the position of the median voter) and being
ambiguous. The main result is that when having exibility in o¢ ce is su¢ ciently
important then there is policy divergence with a non-minimal level of ambiguity
for both candidates. Otherwise there is policy convergence and no ambiguity.
In Aragones and Postlewaite (2002) a model with only three alternative policies
and o¢ ce motivated politicians is considered. Ambiguous positions are modelled
as probability distributions on the set of alternatives. It is known from Fishburn
(1972) that if candidates are not restricted in their choice of distributions then any
equilibrium will consist of degenerate distributions. But Aragones and Postlewaite
restrict the candidates such that each of them must put a minimum of probability
mass on one of the alternatives - the alternative that voters think is most likely
chosen by the candidate after the election. Under that assumption the result of
Fishburn is not valid anymore. The most clean result is found when candidates
are uncertain about the level of intensity of the voters preferences (then candidates
payo¤s are continuous). In that case it holds that (under some further assump-
tions) there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium and in any such equilibrium
candidates are ambiguous (distributions are non-degenerate).
Meirowitz (2005) models a US presidential election with primaries. Each can-
didate can choose to announce a policy in the primaries or to be ambiguous in
the primaries and not announce a policy until the general election. Candidates
must stick to their policy announcements and they are imperfectly informed about
voter preferences. In equilibrium candidates choose not to announce a policies in
the primaries because it enables them to learn more about the electorate before
committing to a policy position and because a candidate announcing a position in
the primaries will be more vulnerable to an unconstrained opponent in the general
election.
Our model is also related to the theoretical literature on valence advantage/can-
didate quality (see e.g. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001) and
Aragones and Palfrey (2002, 2005)). In these models one candidate has an ad-
vantage which makes all voters prefer him over the other candidate if there is
policy convergence. In our model a candidate can have an advantage due to vot-
ersattitudes. But he can only make use of that advantage by being ambiguous
which makes voters who like him assimilate his position. Votersattitudes does
not directly inuence their voting behavior.
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3 The Model
Our starting point is a standard one-dimensional spatial model with two candi-
dates. We will extend that model by allowing candidates to take ambiguous policy
positions and by introducing projection e¤ects in votersperceptions of such posi-
tions. In the following we describe the model in detail.
3.1 The Candidates
Before the election the two candidates announce policy positions. Each candidate
can announce either a certain position or an ambiguous position. A certain po-
sition is represented by a point in the policy space R. An ambiguous position is
represented by a compact interval of policies. Thus the strategy space for each
candidate can be written as
S = f[A  a;A+ a]jA 2 R; a  0g:
Announced positions are credible in the sense that the winning candidate must
enact a policy in his announced interval. So certain positions are credible in the
usual sense.
Each candidates only objective is to win the election, none of them care about
policy. Formally the preference relation of each candidate over the outcome of the
election is given by
win  tie  loose:
Finally we assume that the candidates are fully informed about the electorate and
that this is common knowledge.
3.2 The Electorate
There is a continuum of voters and each of them has a preferred point in the policy
space R. The distribution of preferred points is given by a density function v. We
assume that v is continuous and that the support of v is an interval (bounded
or unbounded). Without loss of generality we assume that the median voter is
located at x = 0, i.e. Z 0
 1
v(x)dx =
Z 1
0
v(x)dx =
1
2
:
Each voter has a utility function on the policy space. Let the utility function of
the median voter be u0 : R ! R. Then the utility function ux0 of a voter with
preferred point at x0 is dened by
ux0(x) = u0(x  x0) for all x 2 R:
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We assume that u0 is symmetric around 0, continuous on R and twice continuously
di¤erentiable on R n f0g with
u00(x) ? 0 for x 7 0;
u000(x) < 0 for x 6= 0:
Thus all voters are strictly risk averse.
We will now model how voters decide on which candidate to vote for. If each
candidate announces a certain position then each voter simply votes for the can-
didate announcing the position with the highest utility. If at least one of the
candidates announces an ambiguous position then it is less obvious how the voters
should decide on who to vote for. We want them to use expected utility. But that
is not straightforward since an ambiguous position is represented by an interval
of policies rather than a probability distribution over policies. For a voter to use
expected utility to evaluate an ambiguous position he has to somehow associate
a probability distribution with the interval representing the position. The distri-
bution represents the voters perception of the ambiguous position. Or, to put it
di¤erently, the voters belief about which policy the candidate will enact if elected.
How voters perceive ambiguous positions is a crucial element of our model and we
will use the rest of this section to describe it.
As mentioned in the introduction, the main idea is that a voters perception of
an ambiguous position depends on whether he has a positive, negative or neutral
(non-policy related) attitude towards the candidate announcing it. If the voter
likes the candidate, i.e. has a positive attitude towards him, then he will put
most of the probability mass on the points of the interval that are closest to
his preferred policy (assimilation). If the voter dislikes the candidate then he
will do the opposite (contrast). And if the voter neither likes nor dislikes the
candidate then he will spread the probability mass evenly across the interval. We
will formalize this below.
For all voters the neutral perception of an ambiguous position is given by
the uniform distribution on the interval. So the perceived expected utility of the
ambiguous position [A  a;A+ a] for a neutral voter with preferred point x0 is
1
2a
Z A+a
A a
ux0(x)dx:
Since voters are strictly risk averse it follows that neutral voters dislike ambiguity.
To model assimilation perceptions rst consider a voter with preferred point
x0  1 and a positive attitude towards a candidate announcing [ 1; 1]. Thus
we are modelling assimilation from the right of an ambiguous position centered
at the median. The probability distribution that the voter associates with the
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ambiguous position is given by some cumulative distribution function F 11 . So the
voters perceived expected utility of the candidates position isZ 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
1
1 (x):
We assume that F 11 satises the following two conditions. U[ 1;1] denotes the
cumulative distribution function of the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1].
 F 11 puts no probability mass outside [ 1; 1] , i.e.
F 11 (x) = 0 for all x <  1 and F 11 (1) = 1:
 F 11 strictly rst order stochastically dominates the uniform distribution on
[ 1; 1], i.e.
F 11 (x)  U[ 1;1](x) for all x 2 R
(with " < " for some x):
The rst condition says that there is no "counterfactual perception". Since the
winning candidate must enact a policy in his announced interval the voter does not
put any probability mass on policies outside the interval. The second condition
is a convenient mathematical way of saying that the voter is assimilating the
candidates position from the right. It means that, for any x 2 [ 1; 1], F 11 puts at
least as much probability mass to the right of x as the uniform distribution does
(and strictly more for some x). Thus we see that, relative to the neutral perception
given by the uniform distribution, the voter "pulls" probability mass to the right,
i.e. towards his own preferred position.
We model assimilation of [ 1; 1] from the left by symmetry. Therefore the
assimilation perception for a voter with preferred point x0   1 is given by the
distribution function F 11 dened by
F 11 (x) = 1  lim
y!( x) 
F 11 (y) for all x 2 R:
Because with this denition we have that, for any x 2 [ 1; 1], F 11 puts exactly as
much probability mass on [ 1; x] as F 11 puts on [ x; 1].
Then consider assimilation of [ 1; 1] by some "interior voter", i.e. a voter with
preferred point x0 2 ( 1; 1). The distribution function representing the perception
of such a voter is denoted F x01 . Again we assume that
F x01 (x) = 0 for all x <  1 and F x01 (1) = 1
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to rule out counterfactual perception. Formalizing the pulling of probability mass
towards x0 is a bit more tricky in this case than it was for "exterior voters", but
the idea is the same. We want the distribution function to put more probability
mass on points close to x0 than the uniform distribution does. More precisely we
assume that, for any x > 0, F x01 puts at least as much probability mass on the
interval (x0   x; x0 + x) as the uniform distribution does (and strictly more for
some x). This can be written formally as
lim
y!x 
F x01 (x0 + y)  F x01 (x0   x)  U[ 1;1](x0 + x)  U[ 1;1](x0   x) for all x > 0
(with " > " for some x).
To have symmetry of perceptions we assume that, for any x0 2 ( 1; 1),
F x01 (x) = 1  lim
y!( x) 
F x01 (y) for all x 2 R:
Thus we are done modelling how voters assimilate the ambiguous position
[ 1; 1]. Now we will extend the model to cover assimilation of all ambiguous
strategies.
First consider assimilation of [ a; a] for some a > 0. In this case we use a
simple scaling of the distribution functions dening assimilation of [ 1; 1]. More
specically the assimilation perceptions of voters with x0  0 are dened as follows
(assuming symmetry this is all we need).
 For a voter with x0  a the distribution function is denoted F aa . It is dened
by
F aa (x) = F
1
1 (
x
a
) for all x 2 R:
 For a voter with 0  x0 < a the distribution function is denoted F x0a . It is
dened by
F x0a (x) = F
x0
a
1 (
x
a
) for all x 2 R:
It is easily seen that these distribution functions satisfy conditions that are analo-
gous to the ones we imposed on the F x01 s. Counterfactual perception is ruled out
because we have, for any 0  x0  a,
F x0a (x) = 0 for all x <  a and F x0a (a) = 1:
And the F x0a s are assimilation perceptions because
F aa (x)  U[ a;a](x) for all x 2 R
(with " < " for some x)
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and, for any 0  x0 < a,
lim
y!x 
F x0a (x0 + y)  F x0a (x0   x)  U[ a;a](x0 + x)  U[ a;a](x0   x) for all x > 0
(with " > " for some x).
Finally we will dene assimilation of intervals of the type [A  a;A+ a] where
A 6= 0. In that case we simply translate the distribution functions dening assim-
ilation of [ a; a] by the constant A. For example, the assimilation perception of
[A   a;A + a] by a voter with x0  A + a is given by the density function FA+aA;a
dened by
FA+aA;a (x) = F
a
a (x  A):
Obviously the translated distribution functions satisfy the "translated" versions of
the conditions satised by the F x0a s.
Contrast perceptions are dened analogously to the way we have just dened
assimilation perceptions. So, for example, the distribution function representing
the contrast perception of voters to the right of some interval is strictly rst order
stochastically dominated by the uniform distribution on the interval. We use the
same notation for contrast perceptions as for assimilation perceptions except that
we replace the Fs by Gs. So the distribution functions representing contrast
perception of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right of the interval is denoted G11 and so on.
For simplicity we assume that voters with the same preferred policy have the
same attitude towards each candidate. Therefore we can dene the attitude func-
tions Li, i = 1; 2, by
Li(x) =
8<:
1 if voters at x have a positive attitude towards Candidate i
0 if voters at x have a neutral attitude towards Candidate i
 1 if voters at x have a negative attitude towards Candidate i
9=; :
We make the technical assumption that, for each i = 1; 2, the sets L 1i (f1g),
L 1i (f0g) and L 1i (f 1g) are Lebesgue measurable (such that we can integrate
over them). Then the fraction of voters that have a positive/neutral/negative
towards Candidate i isZ
L 1i (f1g)
v(x)dx =
Z
L 1i (f0g)
v(x)dx =
Z
L 1i (f 1g)
v(x)dx:
Before we move on we will give some examples of our model of assimilation.
We will get back to these examples later on.
20
3.2.1 Example 1
In our rst example, the assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right is given by
the distribution function F 11 dened by
F 11 (x) =
(
1 
2
x+ 1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; 1)
1 if x = 1
)
;
where 0 <  < 1 is a parameter. This corresponds to a voter to the right believing
that with probability  the policy will be x = 1 (the policy in the interval closest
to his preferred point) and with probability 1    the policy will be drawn from
the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1].
We want a voter with preferred point x0 2 ( 1; 1) to have the same type of
perception, i.e. to believe that with probability  the policy will be x = x0 and
with probability 1   the policy will be drawn from the uniform distribution. The
distribution function corresponding to this perception is
F x01 (x) =
(
1 
2
x  1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; x0)
1 
2
x+ 1+
2
if x 2 [x0; 1]
)
:
It is easily seen that these distribution functions satisfy the required conditions.
The example is extended to cover assimilation of all ambiguous positions as de-
scribed above (by symmetry, scaling and translation).
3.2.2 Example 2
In our second example, the assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right is given
by the density function f 11 dened by
f 11 (x) =
(
1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; 0)
1+
2
if x 2 [0; 1]
)
;
where 0 <   1 is a parameter.
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f 11 for some 0 <  < 1.
We see how a voter to the right of the interval "pulls" probability mass towards his
own preferred point. And we see that he does so without putting any probability
mass on points outside the interval.
It is easily seen that the distribution function corresponding to the density
function above is
F 11 (x) =
(
1 
2
x+ 1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; 0)
1+
2
x+ 1 
2
if x 2 [0; 1]
)
:
And then it is straightforward to show that the distribution strictly rst order
stochastically dominates the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1].
The assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters with x0 2 [0; 1) is given by the density
functions fx01 , x0 2 [0; 1), dened by
fx01 = f
1
1 if
1
2
 x0 < 1
and
fx01 (x) =
(
1 
2
if jx0   xj > 12
1+
2
if jx0   xj  12
)
if 0  x0 < 1
2
:
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fx01 for some x0 2 (0; 12), 0 <  < 1.
Given our denition of assimilation for "exterior voters" this is a natural way of
dening it for "interior voters". In each case a voter puts a constant probability
density of 1+
2
on the half of the interval that is closest to his preferred point and
a constant probability density of 1 
2
on the rest.
It is straightforward to check that the distribution functions given by the fx01 s
satisfy the required conditions. As with our rst example it is extended to cover
assimilation of all ambiguous positions as described above.
4 Results
In this section we will address the questions in the list below. Our answers will
help us understand how and why our introduction of ambiguous positions and
projection e¤ects changes the predictions of the standard model.
1. Under which conditions does the median voter theorem break down because
candidates can take advantage of the assimilation e¤ect by being ambigu-
ous? More specically, when can a candidate win the election by taking
an ambiguous position when the other candidates position is xed at the
median?
2. Under which conditions does a candidate with an advantage due to voters
non-policy related attitudes have a winning strategy? I.e. when does such
a candidate have an ambiguous position that wins the election for him no
matter what position the other candidate takes?
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3. What can we say about existence and properties of Nash equilibria?
All proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
4.1 Defeating the Median
Our rst result shows that a candidate who is liked by a strict majority of voters
can defeat the median, i.e. win the election when the other candidates position is
xed at the median. Furthermore it shows that he can do so by being ambiguous
around the median. Note that no additional assumptions on voter utility functions
or voter perceptions are needed. The result holds even if voters are very risk averse
and the assimilation e¤ect is very small.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose Candidate i is liked by a strict majority of voters, i.e.Z
L 1i (f1g)
v(x)dx >
1
2
:
Then there exists some a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0, Candidate i defeats
the median by announcing the ambiguous position [ a; a]:
Being liked by a strict majority of voters is a necessary condition for a candidate
to be able to defeat the median by an ambiguous position of the type [ a; a],
a > 0. That follows immediately from the assumption that all voters are strictly
risk averse. However, the following result shows that a candidate who is liked by
less than a majority may be able to defeat the median by taking an ambiguous
position that is not centrered at the median. The sets X+i and X
 
i , i = 1; 2, are
dened by
X+i = fx  0jLi(x) = 0g [ fxjLi(x) = 1g
and
X i = fx  0jLi(x) = 0g [ fxjLi(x) = 1g:
We let E11 denote the expected value of F
1
1 .
Theorem 4.2 Suppose X+i contains the preferred points of a strict majority of
voters, i.e. Z
X+i
v(x)dx >
1
2
:
Let A 2 (0; E11). Then there exists some a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0,
Candidate i defeats the median by announcing the ambiguous position
[aA  a; aA+ a]:
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By symmetry it follows that if a strict majority of voters have preferred points
in X i and we let A 2 ( E11 ; 0) then the same conlusion hold. Thus we see that a
candidate who is liked by just a few voters may be able to defeat the median. For
example that is the case if the candidate is not disliked by any voters.
The last result in this section shows that if neither X+i nor X
 
i contains the
preferred points of a strict majority of voters then there exist voter perceptions
(given by F x01 and G
x0
1 , x0 2 [ 1; 1]) such that Candidate i cannot defeat the
median. Thus we have a necessary and su¢ cient condition for Candidate i to be
able to defeat the median for any type of voter perceptions.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that neither X+i nor X
 
i contains the preferred points of a
strict majority of voters, i.e.Z
X+i
v(x)dx  1
2
and
Z
X i
v(x)dx  1
2
:
Then there exist F x01 and G
x0
1 , x0 2 [ 1; 1], (satisfying the assumptions on respec-
tively assimilation and contrast perceptions) such that Candidate i cannot defeat
the median.
4.2 Winning Strategies
Our rst observation is that Candidate i does not have a winning strategy if the
set of voters who like him (L 1i (f1g)) is not a strict majority. Because in that case
Candidate j can always get at least a tie by announcing the midpoint of Candidate
is position. So winning strategies can only exist if at least one candidate is liked by
a strict majority of voters. Here we will only consider the case where one candidate
(Candidate 1) is not disliked by any voters and liked by a strict majority and the
other candidate (Candidate 2) is not liked by any voters. Thus we have
L1(x)  0 for all x 2 R;
Z
L 1i (f1g)
v(x)dx >
1
2
;
and
L2(x)  0 for all x 2 R:
Assuming that Candidate 2 is not liked by any voters means that checking if some
position of Candidate 1 is a winning strategy becomes a lot simpler. Because in
that case we only need to check if Candidate 2 can get at least a tie against it by
taking a certain position.
We will make some additional assumptions on voter utility functions and as-
similation perceptions. We assume that voter utility functions are of the form
u0(x) =  jxj for some  > 1:
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With respect to assimilation perceptions we loosely speaking assume that if two
voters have preferred points that are close then their assimilation perceptions are
also close. More precisely we assume that for any sequence (xn)n2N in [ 1; 1] and
any continuous function f on [ 1; 1],
xn ! x0 )
Z 1
 1
f(x)dF xn1 (x)!
Z 1
 1
f(x)dF x01 (x):
The following result gives conditions for existence and non-existence of winning
strategies for Candidate 1. Remember that E11 denotes the expected value of F
1
1 .
Theorem 4.4 With the additional assumptions from this subsection the following
two statements hold.
1. Suppose there exists a  > 0 such that
( ; )  L 11 (f1g)
and Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) > ux0(E
1
1) for all   1  x0  0:
Then there exists an a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0, [ a; a] is a winning
strategy for Candidate 1.
2. Suppose
ux0(E
1
1) >
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) for all 0 < x0 < 1:
Then Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy. More specically, if
Candidate 1 announces the ambiguous position [A a;A+a] then Candidate
2 can get at least a tie by announcing
A  aE11 if A  0
and
A+ aE11 if A < 0:
(And if Candidate 1 announces a certain position then Candidate 2 can get
at least a draw by announcing the median.)
The rst condition in the rst statement says that Candidate 1 is liked by all
voters in some neighborhood of the median. The second condition says that if a
voter with x0 2 [ 1; 0] likes Candidate 1 then he strictly prefers [ 1; 1] announced
by Candidate 1 over the certain position E11 . In the second statement the condition
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says that any voter with x0 > 0 strictly prefers E11 over [ 1; 1] announced by
Candidate 1.
The following lemma makes it easier to check for non-existence of winning
strategies when some additional assumptions on assimilation perceptions are sat-
ised.
Lemma 4.5 Suppose that, for all 0 < x0 < 1 and x > 0,
lim
y!x 
F 01 (y)  F 01 ( x)  lim
y!x 
F x01 (x0 + y)  F x01 (x0   x):
Furthermore suppose that
Ex01  E11 for all 0 < x0 < 1:
Then the condition in part 2. of Theorem 4.4 is satised ifZ 1
 1
u0(x)dF
0
1 (x)  u0(E11):
The new condition on the F x01 s says that, for any x > 0, F
0
1 puts at least as
much probability mass on ( x; x) as F x01 puts on (x0   x; x0 + x). It implies that
the perceived expected utility of [ 1; 1] for a voter at 0 with perception F 01 is at
least as high as that for a voter at x0 with perception F
x0
1 . The second condition
says that the mean of the assimilation perception of [ 1; 1] for voter a with x0 < 1
is not higher than that for a voter with x0  1.
We will now use our results to analyze cases where assimilation perceptions are
given by the two examples presented earlier.
4.2.1 Example 1
With this type of assimilation we have
E11 = (1  )
Z 1
 1
xdx+  = :
It is straightforward to show that the additional assumptions from this subsection
and the assumptions in Lemma 4.5 are satised. Thus we see that Candidate 1
does not have a winning strategy if
1  
2
Z 1
 1
 jxjdx+ ( j0j)   jj:
By straightforward calculations this inequality can be reduced to
 +
   1
1 + 
 0:
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For any  > 1 the expression on the left hand side is negative for  = 0, positive for
 = 1 and di¤erentiable (w.r.t. ) on [0; 1] with positive derivative. Therefore there
exists a () 2 (0; 1) such that Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy if
  (). We can calculate (2) explicitly by solving a second order equation.
We get
(2) =
p
13  1
6
 :43:
Our general results does not directly allow us to conclude that Candidate 1
has winning strategies if  > (). But we will now show that this is in fact the
case (assuming that Candidate 1 is liked by all voters in some neighborhood of the
median). For each  1  x0  0 there exists a unique Cx0 > x0 such thatZ 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) = ux0(C
x0):
(I.e. for a voter at x0, Cx0 is the certainty equivalent of F
x0
1 to the right of x0).
Lemma 4.6 For each  1  x0  0 we have Cx0  C0.
It follows from the lemma thatZ 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) = ux0(C
x0)  ux0(C0) for all   1  x0  0:
Since  > () we have u0(C0)  u0(E11) and thus C0 < E11 . Therefore we have
ux0(C
0) > ux0(E
1
1) for all   1  x0  0:
And then we can use Theorem 4.4 to conlude that Candidate 1 has winning strate-
gies.
4.2.2 Example 2
With this type of assimilation we have
E11 =
Z 1
 1
xf 11 (x)dx
=
1  
2
Z   1
2
 1
xdx+
1 + 
2
Z 1
2
  1
2
xdx+
1  
2
Z 1
1
2
xdx
=

2
:
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Again it is straightforward to show that the additional assumptions from this
subsection and the assumptions in Lemma 4.5 are satised. Thus we see that
Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy if
1  
2
Z   1
2
 1
 jxjdx+ 1 + 
2
Z 1
2
  1
2
 jxjdx+ 1  
2
Z 1
1
2
 jxjdx   j
2
j:
By straightforward calculations this inequality can be reduced to
(

2
) +

1 + 
(1  (1
2
))  1
1 + 
 0:
For any  > 1 the expression on the left hand side is negative for  = 0, positive
for  = 1 and di¤erentiable (w.r.t. ) on [0; 1] with positive derivative. Therefore
there exists a () 2 (0; 1) such that Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy
if   (). We can calculate (2) explicitly by solving a second order equation.
We get
(2) =
p
57  3
6
 :76:
Our general results does not directly allow us to conclude that Candidate 1
has winning strategies if  > (). But we will now show that this is in fact the
case (assuming that Candidate 1 is liked by all voters in some neighborhood of the
median). As in Example 1 it su¢ ces to show that Cx0  C0 for all  1  x0  0.
That follows from the two lemmas below.
Lemma 4.7 Cx0  C0 for all  1
2
 x0  0.
Lemma 4.8 Cx0  C  12 for all  1  x0   12 .
4.3 Nash Equilibria
4.3.1 Pure Strategies
Here we will make some observations about the existence and properties of pure
strategy Nash equilibria.
First, consider the case where neither candidate can defeat the median. Then
(s1; s

2) = (0; 0), i.e. convergence to the median, is an equilibrium because neither
candidate can win the election by deviating to another position. Furthermore,
if neither of the candidates are liked by exactly 50% of the voters then (0; 0)
is the unique equilibrium (each candidate can then defeat any position di¤erent
from the median). Thus the median voter theorem holds in this situation. If a
candidate is liked by exactly 50% of the voters (and thus disliked by the other 50%
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- otherwise he could defeat the median) then there could exist equilibria where he
is ambiguous. But the outcome would always be a tie and he could also get a tie
by deviating to the median.
Secondly, consider the case where one candidate (Candidate 1) can defeat the
median but the other (Candidate 2) cannot. If Candidate 2 is liked by strictly
less than 50% of the voters then Candidate 1 can defeat any position of Candidate
2. Therefore we have that in any equilibrium Candidate 1 must win the election.
Thus (s1; s

2) is an equilibrium if and only if s

1 is a winning strategy for Candidate
1 (which must be ambiguous). So we have existence of Nash equilibria if and only
if we have existence of winning strategies for Candidate 1. If Candidate 2 is liked
by exactly 50% of the voters then the equilibrium outcome is a tie if Candidate
2 has a position that gives him at least a tie against any position of Candidate
1. If Candidate 2 does not have such a position then we again have that in any
equilibrium Candidate 1 must win the election. In both situations it follows that
in any equilibrium at least one candidate will be ambiguous.
Finally, consider the case where both candidates can defeat the median. With-
out loss of generality assume that Candidate 1 is liked by at least as many voters
as Candidate 2. If Candidate 2 is liked by strictly less than 50% of the voters then
we have that (s1; s

2) is an equilibrium if and only if s

1 is a winning strategy for
Candidate 1 (Candidate 1 can defeat any position of Candidate 2). If Candidate
2 is liked by at least 50% of the voters then consider the numbers
Pi =
Z
fxjLi(x)>Lj(x)g
v(x)dx; i = 1; 2; j 6= i:
Pi is the share of voters who has a more positive attitude towards Candidate i
than towards Candidate j. If Pi > Pj then Candidate i can defeat any position
of Candidate j by imitation. Thus it follows that (s1; s

2) is an equilibrium if and
only if si is a winning strategy for Candidate i. If Pi = Pj then each candidate can
get a tie against any position of the other candidate (again by imitation). Thus
any equilibrium outcome must be a tie and both candidates must be ambiguous
in equilibrium.
4.3.2 Mixed Strategies
We have just seen that when at least one candidate can defeat the median, then,
except perhaps for some very special cases, pure strategy Nash equilibria only exist
if one candidate has a winning strategy. And we know from earlier that winning
strategies do not always exist even in the extreme case where one candidate is liked
by all voters and the other candidate is disliked by all voters. So it is natural to
ask the question if mixed strategy equilibria exist when pure strategy equilibria
do not.
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Consider again the model with the extra assumptions from the subsection on
winning strategies. The question then is if there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium
when Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy. The result below shows
that when the condition for non-existence of winning strategies in Theorem 4.4 is
satised then the answer is no (except perhaps in a knife edge case).
Theorem 4.9 Suppose all the assumptions from the subsection on winning strate-
gies are satised. If
ux0(E
1
1) >
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) for all 0  x0 < 1
then there does not exist a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
With respect to our examples of assimilation, the theorem implies that if
 < () (in Example 1) or  < () (in Example 2) then a mixed strategy
equilibrium does not exist.
5 Discussion
Our goal in this paper has been to theoretically investigate if positive projection
(assimilation) of policy positions can explain why some politicians are ambiguous
with respect to their issue positions. To do that we have extended the standard
Downsian model of electoral competition by allowing candidates to take ambiguous
policy positions and by introducing projection e¤ects in votersperceptions of such
positions. By assuming that voters dislike ambiguity per se (if attitudes are neutral
then voters dislike ambiguity because of risk aversion) we have made sure that
projection is the driving force behind any result predicting ambiguity.
In the standard model the median defeats any other position. Therefore a
natural rst step was to nd out under which conditions a candidate can defeat
the median by being ambiguous. We presented necessary and su¢ cient conditions.
We saw that it may su¢ ce for a candidate to be liked by only a small group of
voters as long as he is not disliked by too many. For example, if a candidate is not
disliked by any voters then he can defeat the median if he is liked by an arbitrarily
small group of voters.
While having at least one candidate that is able to defeat the median by being
ambiguous is certainly a necessary condition for predicting ambiguity it is far from
su¢ cient. Electoral competition is a strategic situation and there is no reason
to assume that one candidate will announce the median if he can do better by
taking a di¤erent position. Therefore our next step was to look at existence and
non-existence of winning strategies (which must be ambiguous). We restricted
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attention to the case where one candidate is not liked by any voters and made some
additional assumptions on voter utility functions and perceptions. We saw that if
the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong then a candidate who is not disliked
by any voters and liked by a strict majority has winning strategies. But even if
he is liked by all voters he may not have winning strategies. So our model does
predict that a generally liked candidate will be ambiguous if he is running against
a candidate who is generally not liked and the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently
strong. But even a candidate with the largest possible advantage due to voters
non-policy related attitudes may not have a position that wins the election for him
(if the assimilation e¤ect is not strong enough). That is a rather striking result.
While the possible non-existence of winning strategies even for a candidate with
the largest possible advantage due to votersattitudes is an interesting feature of
the model it is also problematic. Because, as our observations on Nash equilibria
revealed, when at least one candidate can defeat the median then non-existence of
winning strategies implies non-existence of pure strategy equilibria (except perhaps
in some very special cases). So when the median voter theorem breaks down but
neither candidate has a winning strategy then our model does not give us clear
predictions in terms of pure strategy equilibria. And we have also seen that turning
attention to mixed strategy equilibria is not a solution to this problem. So an
obvious direction for further research is to come up with a model that give better
equilibrium predictions.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
For each n 2 N let
Xni = fxjLi(x) = 1;
1
n
 jxj  ng:
Since a strict majority of voters likes Candidate i there exists an N 2 N such that
XNi contains the preferred points of a strict majority of voters. We will prove that
there exists an a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0, all voters with x0 2 XNi
strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate i over the median (x = 0).
For each a > 0,
max
 aya
ju00x0(y)j
is a continuous function of x0 on (a;1). So for a < 1N it follows by compactness
that the function is bounded on [ 1
N
; N ]. Thus we can dene
Ca = max
1
N
x0N
max
 aya
ju00x0(y)j:
Now let 1
N
 x0  N , 0 < a < 1N and x 2 [ a; a]. Then, by Taylors theorem,
we have
ux0(x) = ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x+
u00x0()
2
x2:
for some  2 [ a; a] (actually between 0 and x). And thus it follows that
ux0(x)  ux0(0) + u0x0(0)x 
Ca
2
x2:
Using this inequality we get (E11 denotes the expected value of F
1
1 )Z a
 a
ux0(x)dF
a
a (x) 
Z a
 a
(ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x  Ca
2
x2)dF aa (x)
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)
Z a
 a
xdF aa (x) 
Ca
2
Z a
 a
x2dF aa (x)
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)aE11  
Ca
2
Z a
 a
x2dF aa (x)
 ux0(0) + u0x0(0)aE11  
Ca
2
a2
Z a
 a
dF aa (x)
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)aE11  
Ca
2
a2
 ux0(0) + u00( 
1
N
)aE11  
Ca
2
a2:
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Since u00(  1N ) > 0, E11 > 0 and Ca is decreasing with a it follows that, for a
su¢ ciently small,Z a
 a
ux0(x)dF
a
a (x) > ux0(0) for all
1
N
 x0  N
So all voters with 1
N
 x0  N and Li(x0) = 1 strictly prefer [ a; a] announced
by Candidate i over the median for a su¢ ciently small. By symmetry the same
holds for voters with  N  x0    1N and Li(x0) = 1. Thus it holds for all voters
with x0 2 XNi . 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Let A 2 (0; E11). Pick an N 2 N such that a majority of voters have preferred
points in
XN+i = fxjx 2 X+i ;
1
N
 jxj  Ng:
For a > 0 with aA+ a < 1
N
we can dene
CA;a = max
1
N
jx0jN
max
aA ayaA+a
ju00x0(y)j:
Then, by Taylors theorem, we get that for all x0 with 1N  jx0j  N and all a > 0
with aA+ a < 1
N
,
ux0(x)  ux0(0) + u0x0(0)x 
CA;a
2
x2 for all x 2 [aA  a; aA+ a]:
For all voters with x0 2 X+i , 1N  x0  N the perceived expected utility of
[aA  a; aA+ a] is at least
1
2a
Z aA+a
aA a
ux0(x)dx:
Using the inequality above we get that, for all a > 0 with aA+ a < 1
N
,
1
2a
Z aA+a
aA a
ux0(x)dx 
Z aA+a
aA a
(ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x  CA;a
2
x2)dx
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)aA  CA;a
2
Z aA+a
aA a
x2dx
 ux0(0) + u0x0(0)aA 
CA;a
2
(aA+ a)2
 ux0(0) + u00( 
1
N
)Aa  CA;a
2
(1 + A)2a2:
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The last expression is strictly greater than ux0(0) for small a > 0. So it follows
that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x0 2 X+i , 1N  x0  N strictly prefer
[aA  a; aA+ a] over the median.
For all voters with x0 2 X+i ,  N  x0    1N the perceived expected utility of
[aA  a; aA+ a] (with   1
N
< aA  a) isZ aA+a
aA a
ux0(x)dF
aA a
aA;a (x):
Using the "Taylor inequality" from above we get that, for all a > 0 with
aA+ a < 1
N
,Z aA+a
aA a
ux0(x)dF
aA a
aA;a (x) 
Z aA+a
aA a
(ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x  CA;a
2
x2)dF aA aaA;a (x)
 ux0(0) + u0x0(0)(aA  aE11) 
CA;a
2
(aA+ a)2
 ux0(0) + u00(
1
N
)(A  E11)a 
CA;a
2
(1 + A)2a2:
The last expression is is strictly greater than ux0(0) for small a > 0. So it follows
that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x0 2 X+i ,  N  x0    1N strictly
prefer [aA  a; aA+ a] over the median.
Thus we have seen that for a > 0 su¢ ciently small, all voters with x0 2 XN+i
(a majority) prefer [aA  a; aA+ a] over the median. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.3.
Suppose that assimilation perceptions are as in Example 1 (for some 0 <  < 1).
Let contrast perceptions be given by
Gx01 =

F 11 if x0 2 [ 1; 0)
F 11 if x0 2 [0; 1]

:
Suppose Candidate i announces some interval. We will show that at least 50% of
the voters strictly prefer the median over the interval.
The interval can be written as
[aA  a; aA+ a] for some A 2 R; a > 0:
For A = 0 all voters with Li(x0)  0 (at least 50%) strictly prefer the median (by
risk aversion).
For A  E11 it is easily seen that
E(F x0aA;a)  aA  aE11  0 for all x0 2 [aA  a; aA+ a]:
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And then it follows by risk aversion that all voters with x0  0 strictly prefer the
median over the interval. Analogously it follows that if A   E11 then all voters
with x0  0 prefer strictly the median over the interval.
Thus the only cases left are A 2 (0; E11) and A 2 ( E11 ; 0). Suppose A 2
(0; E11). Then it is straightforward to check that for each voter with
x0 2 fx  0jLi(x) =  1g [ fx < 0jLi(x)  0g
the mean of the voters perception of the interval is further away from x0 than the
median (0). Thus all these voters strictly prefer the median over the interval (by
risk aversion). Since the set above is the complement of X+i these voters constitute
at least a weak majority. If A 2 ( E11 ; 0) then it follows analogously that all voters
with x0 =2 X i strictly prefer the median over the interval. Again that is at least a
weak majority. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.4.
1. First we show that Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x)
is a continuous function of x0 on [ 1; 1]. Let x0 2 [ 1; 1] and et (xn) be a sequence
in [ 1; 1] such that xn ! x0. Then we have
j
Z 1
 1
uxn(x)dF
xn
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x)j
 j
Z 1
 1
uxn(x)dF
xn
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
xn
1 (x)j
+j
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
xn
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x)j
 max
x2[ 1;1]
juxn(x)  ux0(x)j
+j
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
xn
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x)j:
The rst term in the last expression converges to zero because of the continuity of
u0 and the compactness of [ 1; 1]. The second term converges to zero by the con-
tinuity assumption on the F x01 s. That proves the continuity of
R 1
 1 ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x).
Then we can nd a 0 < C < E11 and an " > 0 such thatZ 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) > ux0(C) for all x0 2 [ 1; "]:
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The following two claims nishes the proof of the rst part of the theorem.
Claim A: For su¢ ciently small a > 0, [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1
defeats any y 2 ( aC; aC) announced by Candidate 2.
Proof: Choose an N 2 N such that a strict majority of voters have preferred
points in the set
XN1 = fxjL1(x) = 1;
1
N
 jxj  Ng:
It su¢ ces to show that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x0 2 XN1 , x0 > 0
will prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over aC announced by Candidate 2.
Since 0 < C < E11 that follows by Taylors theorem as in earlier proofs.
Claim B: For su¢ ciently small a > 0, [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1
defeats any y =2 ( aC; aC) announced by Candidate 2.
Proof: Let a < . From the homogeneity (of degree ) of u0 and what we have
shown above it follows that for any x0 2 [ a; a"],Z a
 a
ux0(x)dF
x0
a (x) =
Z 1
 1
ux0(ax)dF
x0
1 (ax) = a

Z 1
 1
ux0
a
(x)dF
x0
a
1 (x)
> aux0
a
(C) = ux0(aC):
Thus we see that all voters with x0 2 [ a; a"] strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by
Candidate 1 over any certain position y  aC.
Voters with x0 2 ( ; a) has the same perception of [ a; a] announced by
Candidate 1 as voters with x0 =  a. And they are less (absolute) risk-averse on
[ a; a]. Therefore these voters also prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over
any y  aC.
By Taylors theorem it is easily seen that voters with x0 =   and a neutral
attitude towards Candidate 1 strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over
any y  aC when a is small enough. The same is true for voters with x0 <  
because they are less risk averse on [ a; a].
Thus all voters with x0  a" strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 to
any y  aC for a su¢ ciently small. By symmetry it follows that, for a su¢ ciently
small, all voters with x0   a" stricly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 to
any y   aC. That ends the proof of the claim.
2. Suppose Candidate 1 announces [A   a;A + a] for some A  0 (if A < 0
the proof is analogous). Then, by the homogeneity of u0 and the condition in the
statement, we have that all voters with x0 2 (A   a;A) strictly prefer A   aE11
announced by Candidate 2 over the interval announced by Candidate 1. By risk
aversion the same is true for voters with x0  A a. Thus at least 50% of the vot-
ers strictly prefer A  aE11 announced by Candidate 2 over the interval announced
by Candidate 1. 2
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Proof of Lemma 4.5.
Suppose Z 1
 1
u0(x)dF
0
1 (x)  u0(E11):
By the rst assumption in the lemma it follows that, for all 0 < x0 < 1,Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
u0(x)dF
0
1 (x):
Therefore we have that, for all x0 2 (0; E11 ],Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
u0(x)dF
0
1 (x)  u0(E11) < ux0(E11):
For x0 2 (E11 ; 1) it follows from the second assumption in the lemma that E11
is (weakly) closer to x0 than E
x0
1 . So by risk aversion it follows that, for all
x0 2 (E11 ; 1), Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) < ux0(E
x0
1 )  ux0(E11):
Thus the condition in part 2. of Theorem 4.4 is satised. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.6.
For each x0 2 [ 1; 0] let Cx0U > x0 be dened by
1
2
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dx = ux0(C
x0
U ):
If Cx0U  C0U then we have
ux0(0) + (1  )ux0(C0U)  ux0(x0) + (1  )ux0(Cx0U ) = ux0(Cx0):
So the certainty equivalent (the one to the right of the preferred point) of the
lottery "0 with probability , C0U with probability 1   " for a voter at x0 is
greater than or equal to Cx0. The certainty equivalent of the same lottery for a
voter at 0 is C0. And since voters at x0 are less absolute risk averse on [0; C0U ]
than voters at 0 the certainty equivalent for a voter at 0 is greater than that for a
voter at x0. Thus we must have Cx0  C0. So we see that it su¢ ces to show that
Cx0U  C0U for all x0 2 [ 1; 0).
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Let x0 2 [ 1; 0). Dene Cx0U ; Cx0U+ > x0 and C0U ; C0U+ > 0 by
1
2 + x0
Z x0+1
 1
ux0(x)dx = ux0(C
x0
U );
1
 x0
Z 1
x0+1
ux0(x)dx = ux0(C
x0
U+)
and
1
2 + x0
Z x0+1
 1
u0(x)dx = u0(C
0
U );
1
 x0
Z 1
x0+1
u0(x)dx = u0(C
0
U+):
It is easily seen that
Cx0U   C0U  and Cx0U+  C0U+:
Thus we have that
2 + x0
2
ux0(C
0
U ) +
 x0
2
ux0(C
0
U+) 
2 + x0
2
ux0(C
x0
U ) +
 x0
2
ux0(C
x0
U+) = ux0(C
x0
U ):
So the certainty equivalent (the one to the right of the preferred point) of the
lottery "C0U  with probability
2+x0
2
, C0U+ with probability
 x0
2
" for a voter at x0
is greater than or equal to Cx0U . The certainty equivalent of the same lottery for a
voter at 0 is C0U . And since voters at x0 are less absolute risk averse on [C
0
U ; C
0
U+]
than voters at 0 the certainty equivalent for a voter at 0 is greater than that for a
voter at x0. Thus we must have C
x0
U  C0U . 2
Proof of Lemma 4.7.
For each x0 2 [ 1; 0] let Cx0U > x0 be dened an in the proof of lemma 4.6.
Furthermore let 0 < D0 < C0U be dened byZ 1
2
  1
2
u0(x)dx = u0(D
0):
From the proof of Lemma 4.6 we know thatCx0U  C0U for all x0 2 [ 1; 0]. Therefore
we have, for each x0 2 [ 12 ; 0],
ux0(D
0) + (1  )ux0(C0U)  
Z x0+ 12
x0  12
ux0(x)dx+ (1  )ux0(Cx0U ) = ux0(Cx0):
So the certainty equivalent (the one to the right of the preferred point) of the lot-
tery "0 with probability , C0U with probability 1  " for a voter at x0 is greater
than or equal to Cx0. The certainty of the same lottery for a voter at 0 is C0. And
since voters at x0 are less risk averse on [D0; C0U ] than voters at 0 the certainty
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equivalent for a voter at 0 is greater than that for a voter at x0. Thus we must
have Cx0  C0. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.8.
For each x0 2 [ 1; 12 ] the assimilation perception of [ 1; 1] is a convex com-
bination of the uniform distribution on [ 1; 0] and the uniform distribution on
[ 1; 1]. Let Cx0U be dened as in the proof of lemma 4.6. Furthermore let Dx0 > x0
be dened by Z 0
 1
ux0(x)dx = ux0(D
x0):
Mimicking arguments from the proof of Lemma 4.6 it follows that Cx0U  C
  1
2
U and
Dx0  D  12 for all x0 2 [ 1; 12 ] . Therefore we have that for each x0 2 [ 1; 12 ] ,
ux0(D
  1
2 ) + (1  )ux0(C 
1
2
U )  ux0(Dx0) + (1  )ux0(Cx0U ) = ux0(Cx0):
And since a voter at x0 <  12 is less risk averse than a voter at  12 on [D 
1
2 ; C
  1
2
U ]
it follows that Cx0  C  12 for all x0 2 [ 1; 12 ] (same argument as in the two
previous proofs). 2
Proof of Theorem 4.9.
Suppose (1;2) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We will show that this
leads to a contradiction.
Let " > 0. Then there exists a0 > 0 such that 2 puts less than " probability
mass on the certain positions in ( a0; a0) n f0g. Therefore, by announcing the
ambiguous position [ a; a] for a su¢ ciently close to zero Candidate 1 can defeat
2 with probability greater than 1   " (Candidate 1 defeats all certain positions
not in ( a0; a0) n f0g). Thus it follows that in the equilibrium (1;2), Candidate
1 must win with probability one.
Pick A 2 R, a > 0 such that, for any neighborhood B of ( A; a), 1 puts
positive probability on
f[A  a;A+ a]j(A; a) 2 Bg:
The following claim shows that for some B Candidate 2 has a position that defeats
all positions in the set above. Thus it follows that in the equilibrium (1;2),
Candidate 2 must win with some positive probability. That is a contradiction.
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Claim: Suppose Candidate 2 announces
A+ aE11 if A  0
A  aE11 if A > 0

:
Then there exists some neighborhood B of ( A; a) such that he defeats all positions
of Candidate 1 in the set
f[A  a;A+ a]j(A; a) 2 Bg:
Proof: We will only do the proof for A  0, the other case is completely
analogous. By announcing A+aE11 Candidate 2 defeats [ A a; A+a] (by Theorem
4.4, part 2.). We have to show that he also defeats "nearby" ambiguous positions.
Suppose not. Then there exists a sequence (An; an) that converges to ( A; a) and
satises that, for any n, [An an; An+an] announced by Candidate 1 gets at least
a tie against A+aE11 announced by Candidate 2. Therefore, there must exist x0s
such that Z
ux0(x)dF
x0
An;an
(x)9
Z
ux0(x)dF
x0
A;a
(x):
(If x0 < An   an then F x0An;an means FAn anAn;an and so on). By using the denitions
of F x0An;an and F
x0
A;a
and the continuity assumption on the F x01 s in the section on
winning strategies it follows that there is convergence for all x0s. Thus we have a
contradiction. 2
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Abstract
In this paper we contribute to the study of how democracy works when
politicians are better informed than the electorate about conditions relevant
for policy choice. We do so by setting up and analyzing a game theoretic
model of electoral competition. An important feature of the model is that
candidate quality is state-dependent. Our main insight is that if the elec-
torate is su¢ ciently well informed then there exists an equilibrium where the
candidatespolicy positions reveal their information and the policy outcome
is the same as it would be if voters were fully informed (the median policy
in the true state of the world).
Keywords: Electoral Competition, Uncertainty, Private Information, Can-
didate Quality, Revealing Equilibria.
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1 Introduction
It is a reasonable assumption that politicians are generally better informed than
the electorate about conditions relevant for policy choice. They usually have sta¤
to help them receive and process information and sometimes have access to in-
formation that is not public, for example information related to national security.
Furthermore they have much stronger incentives than voters to be well informed
because their carreers depend on how they do as policy makers. In this paper
we contribute to the study of how democracy works when politicians are better
informed than voters. We do so by setting up and analyzing a game theoretic
model of electoral competition.
We consider an election with two candidates and one issue. The candidates
are purely o¢ ce-motivated, i.e. their only objective is to maximize the probability
of winning. Before the election the candidates announce credible policy positions.
There are two states of the world. Both candidates are informed about the true
state when they announce their positions. Voters are only partially informed about
the state, they receive a signal that is correlated with the true state. This signal
is private information, i.e. it is unknown to the candidates when they announce
positions. Each voter has a single peaked policy utility function in each state and
the preferred policy is di¤erent in the two states.
The voters do not only care about policy, they also care about candidate quality.
One candidate has a quality advantage in one state and the other candidate has
a quality advantage in the other state. Furthermore there is a stochastic element
in voter evaluation of candidates. Suppose for example that the two candidates
have announced the same position and that the voters have inferred the true state.
Then the candidate with a quality advantage wins with a probability that is greater
than one half (because of the quality advantage) but smaller than one (because of
the stochastic element of voter evaluation).
A revealing equilibrium is one where at least one of the candidates announces
di¤erent policies in the two states. Thus voters can infer the true state. Our rst
main result is that in any such equilibrium (satisfying a known renement condi-
tion) the candidates converge to the median position of the true state. Our second
main result is that a revealing equilibrium exists when the electorate is su¢ ciently
well informed about the state of the world. So when voters are su¢ ciently well
informed then it is at least a possibility (there could exist non-revealing equilibria)
that electoral competition works as if the voters were fully informed.
Our rst result on non-revealing equilibria show that many of these exist. Fur-
thermore, we see that no matter how well informed the electorate is there always
exists a non-revealing equilibrium, even with a symmetry restriction. None of these
equilibria can be eliminated by the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987))
which is the most commonly used renement condition in signalling games. In-
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stead we show that a monotonicity condition on votersbeliefs does eliminate many
of the non-revealing equilibria. With that condition a non-revealing equilibrium
only exists if the voters are not too well informed. We also see that the candidates
diverge by at least the distance between the medians in the two states.
Before we move on we will present a stylized example of a real world situation
where our model applies. Suppose a retired general is running against a succesful
governor for the US presidency. Both of them primarily care about getting elected,
policy preferences are secondary. The main issue is how much of a xed tax
revenue to spend on national security related public goods (e.g. military services,
anti-terrorism, a missile defense system). The rest of the budget is spend on
other public goods (e.g. health care, education, infrastructure). The candidates
know more about the security threat to the country than the voters because they
get national security briengs while voters only get information from the media.
When the threat is high then each voter wants to spend more on security related
public goods than when it is low. Thus the median preferred level of national
secuity spending is higher when the threat is high. Furthermore, when the security
threat is high then the general has a quality advantage (national security issues
are more important) and when the threat is low then the governor has a quality
advantage (domestic issues are more important). The possibility of unforeseen
events, scandals, campaign mistakes etc. makes voting stochastic.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review related literature.
Then, in Section 3 and 4, we set up the model and dene our notion of equilib-
rium. Section 5 and 6 contain our results on revealing and non-revealing equilibria.
Finally we discuss and conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Literature
The two most immediately related papers are Schultz (1996) and Martinelli (2001).
They ask the same general question as we do but they both assume that candi-
dates are policy-motivated. This is fundamentally di¤erent from our assumption
about completely o¢ ce-motivated candidates. In Schultz (1996) candidates are
fully informed about the state of the economy while voters are uninformed. Thus
voters only receive information from the candidatescredible positions. There is
revelation in (rened) equilibrium if at least one of the candidates have policy
preferences that are su¢ ciently similar to the preferences of the median voter. In
any revealing equilibrium there is convergence to the median policy of the true
state of the world.
Martinelli (2001) considers a model where both candidates and voters receive
private information about the state of the world but candidates are better informed
than voters. The main result is that a revealing equilibrium always exists. This
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depends crucially on the assumption that voters have private information. The
candidates do not converge in revealing equilibria.
Several other papers study models in which politicians are better informed than
the electorate. In both Alesina and Cukierman (1990) and Harrington (1993) pol-
icy is decided after the election and voters are uncertain about the candidates
policy preferences. Therefore earlier policy decisions by the incumbent reveal in-
formation to the voters about what he will do if reelected. That induces the
incumbent (who wants to be reelected) to distort his policy choice. In Alesina and
Cukierman he does so by choosing a noisy policy instrument, in Harrington it is
done by choosing a policy that is more likely to be well received.
Roemer (1994) considers a model where two policy motivated candidates (par-
ties) are better informed about how the economy works than the electorate. Can-
didates announce both policies and theories of the economy, voters update their
beliefs based only on announced theories. In equilibrium there is convergence to
the median with respect to policy but divergence with respect to theory.
In Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) the incumbent is better informed than vot-
ers about how di¤erent policies map into outcomes. Voters update beliefs based on
the incumbents (credible) policy announcement and votes for reelection if his an-
nouncement is preferred to the expected policy of the challenger. The main insight
is that relatively extreme right wing policies are more likely to be implemented by
a left wing incumbent (and vice versa) because of credibility issues.
Our model is also related to the literature on candidate quality/valence advan-
tage. Recent contributions to this literature are Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),
Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002, 2005). These papers all ana-
lyze models of electoral competition where candidates di¤er in quality such that
if they announce su¢ ciently similar policy positions then each voter votes for the
candidate of highest quality. There is no uncertainty about who the high quality
candidate is. This is fundamentally di¤erent from our paper where no candidate
has an a priori quality advantage because quality is state-dependent. We are not
aware of other models with uncertainty about candidate quality.
3 The Model
We consider a one issue election. The policy space X is some closed interval
(bounded or unbounded) on the real axis. There are two purely o¢ ce-motivated
candidates, i.e. their only objective is to maximize the probability of winning.
The electorate consists of a continuum of voters (indexed by i). The voters
have utility functions over the policy space. The utility functions depend on the
state of the world ! which can be either L or H. The utility function of voter i is
ui(xj!) =  jx  xi (!)j; x 2 X;! 2 fL;Hg;
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where xi (!) is the preferred policy of voter i in state !. The preferred policies of
the voters in each state are distributed according to some distribution functions
FL; FH . In each state there are unique median positions, i.e. unique xmL ; x

mH
2 X
such that
FL(x

mL
) = FH(x

mH
) =
1
2
:
We assume that the median is further to the right in state H than in state L, i.e.
xmL < x

mH
:
Furthermore, we assume that the ordering of voters by preferred positions is the
same in the two states. Formally, for all voters i; j,
xi (L)  xj(L) () xi (H)  xj(H)
This implies that, for all voters i,
xi (L) = x

mL
() xi (H) = xmH
Thus a voter with preferred policy equal to the median in one state also has
preferred policy equal to the median in the other state. So (with only a slight
abuse of language) it makes sense to speak about the median voter.
The candidates are fully informed about the state of the world. The voters
only receive a signal
!V 2 fl; hg:
All voters receive the same signal and the signal is unknown to the candidates
when they announce positions. The signal is distributed according to
Pr(ljL) = Pr(hjH) = ;
Pr(ljH) = Pr(hjL) = 1  ;
where  2 (1
2
; 1) is a parameter. Each voter has the prior Pr(L) = Pr(H) = 1
2
. So
if voters update based on their signal then their belief is given by
Pr(Ljl) = Pr(Hjh) = ;
Pr(Hjl) = Pr(Ljh) = 1  :
Candidate quality is state-dependent. One candidate ("Candidate L") has a
quality advantage in the L state while the other candidate ("Candidate H") has
a quality advantage in the H state. Furthermore there is a symmetric stochastic
element to each voters candidate preference. These two features are modelled
the following way. Suppose Candidate L has announced the policy xL and that
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Candidate H has announced xH . Then voter is utility of voting for Candidate L
is
ULi (x
Lj!) = ui(xLj!) +  L(!) + ;
where, for some parameter  > 0,
 L(!) =

 if ! = L
0 if ! = H

and, for some parameter  > 0,  is drawn from a uniform distribution on the
interval [  1
2
; 1
2
]. Note that the realized value of  is the same for all voters.
Voter is utility of voting for Candidate H is
UHi (x
H j!) = ui(xH j!) +  H(!):
where
 H(!) =

0 if ! = L
 if ! = H

:
Each voter votes for the candidate giving him the highest expected utility based
on his belief about the state of the world. So if voter i believes that the probability
of state L is L then he votes for Candidate L if
L(ui(x
LjL)++)+(1 L)(ui(xLjH)+) > Lui(xH jL)+(1 L)(ui(xH jH)+):
This is equivalent to
 > L(ui(x
H jL)  ui(xLjL)  ) + (1  L)(ui(xH jH)  ui(xLjH) + ):
If we plug in the policy utility function of the voter then this inequality becomes
 > L(jxL xi (L)j jxH xi (L)j )+(1 L)((jxL xi (H)j jxH xi (H)j+):
The timeline of the election game is as follows:
1. The candidates observe the state of the world and then simultaneously an-
nounce policy positions.
2. The voters observe the candidatespositions and receive a signal about the
state of the world. The value of  is realized. The voters cast their votes.
3. The winning candidate enacts his announced position (positions are credi-
ble).
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4 Equilibrium
A strategy prole for the candidates consists of a policy announcement in each
state of the world for each candidate and can therefore be written
(xL(L); xL(H)); (xH(L); xH(H)):
The belief functions of the voters depend on the two candidatesannouncements
and the voterssignal. We make the assumption that all voters have the same belief
function. The votersbelief about the probability of state L is written
L(x
L; xH ; !V ):
Each candidates objective is to maximize the probability of winning in each
state given the other candidates strategy, the belief function of the voters, the
distribution of the voterssignal and the distribution of . The following lemma
shows that the median voter decides the election.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that, given the candidatesannouncements, the voterssig-
nal, and the realization of , the median voter strictly prefers Candidate L (H).
Then a strict majority of voters prefers Candidate L (H).
Proof. Suppose the median voter strictly prefers Candidate L, i.e.
 > L(jxL   xmL j   jxH   xmL j   ) + (1  L)((jxL   xmH j   jxH   xmH j+ ):
We then have to show that for each voter i in a strict majority,
 > L(jxL xi (L)j jxH xi (L)j )+(1 L)((jxL xi (H)j jxH xi (H)j+):
Suppose xL  xH (the other case is analogous). It then su¢ ces to show that
the inequality above holds for all voters i with xi (L)  xmL (that is only a weak
majority but a simple continuity argument shows that the inequality also holds
for voters with a preferred point slightly to the right of the median).
Pick a voter i with xi (L)  xmL . The inequality is satised if
jxL   xi (L)j   jxH   xi (L)j  jxL   xmL j   jxH   xmL j
and
jxL   xi (H)j   jxH   xi (H)j  jxL   xmH j   jxH   xmH j.
These inequalities are straightforward to verify.
The proof of the statement when the median voter strictly prefers Candidate
H is analogous.2
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By the lemma we see that if (xH(L); xH(H)) is the strategy of Candidate H
then the problem of Candidate L in state ! is
max
x
Pr
;(!V j!)
[ > L(x; x
H(!); !V )((jx  xmL j   jxH(!)  xmL j   )+
(1  L(x; xH(!); !V ))(jx  xmH j   jxH(!)  xmH j+ )]:
And if (xL(L); xL(H)) is the strategy of Candidate L then the problem of Candi-
date H in state ! is
max
x
Pr
;(!V j!)
[ < L(x
L(!); x; !V )((jxL(!)  xmL j   jx  xmL j   )+
(1  L(xL(!); x; !V ))(jxL(!)  xmH j   jx  xmH j+ )]:
Then we are ready to dene our notion of equilibrium. It is that of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium with the extra condition that all voters have the same belief
function.
Denition 4.2 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium consists of candidate strategies
(x^L(L); x^L(H)); (x^H(L); x^H(H));
and a voter belief function about the probability of state L
^L(x
L; xH ; !V )
such that
1. In each state each candidates announcement maximizes his probability of
winning given the other candidates announcement, the belief function of the
voter, the distribution of the voters signal and the distribution of ;
2. The belief function is consistent with Bayes rule on the equilibrium path.
I.e. if x^L(L) 6= x^L(H) or x^H(L) 6= x^H(H) then
^L(x^
L(L); x^H(L); l) = ^L(x^
L(L); x^H(L); h) = 1,
^L(x^
L(H); x^H(H); l) = ^L(x^
L(H); x^H(H); h) = 0:
And if x^L(L) = x^L(H) and x^H(L) = x^H(H) then
^L(x^
L(L); x^H(L); !V ) = ^L(x^
L(H); x^H(H); !V ) =

 if !V = l
1   if !V = h

:
An equilibrium where the announcements of the candidates reveal the state to
the voters, i.e. at least one of the candidates announces di¤erent positions in the
two states, is called a revealing equilibrium. An equilibrium where each candidate
announces the same position in both states is called a non-revealing equilibrium.
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5 Revealing Equilibria
We will rst introduce a renement condition that puts restrictions on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs in revealing equilibria. It has been used by Schultz (1996) in
a similar setting. The content of the condition is that if one candidates strategy
reveals the state (i.e. he takes di¤erent positions in the two states) and the other
candidate deviates to an out-of-equilibrium position then the voters believe the
non-deviating candidate.
Denition 5.1 (Renement Condition (R1)) Consider a revealing equilibrium
where the candidate strategies are (x^L(L); x^L(H)) and (x^H(L); x^H(H)) and the
voter belief function is ^L. It satises (R1) if the following two conditions are
satised.
1. Suppose x^L(L) 6= x^L(H). Then
^L(x^
L(L); x; l) = ^L(x^
L(L); x; h) = 1 and
^L(x^
L(H); x; l) = ^L(x^
L(H); x; h) = 0 for all x 6= x^H(L); x^H(H):
2. Suppose x^H(L) 6= x^H(H). Then
^L(x; x^
H(L); l) = ^L(x; x^
H(L); h) = 1 and
^L(x; x^
H(H); l) = ^L(x; x^
H(H); h) = 0 for all x 6= x^L(L); x^L(H):
Let D denote the distance between the median position in the two states, i.e.
D = xmH   xmL :
For all of our results in this and the following section we will assume that
 +D <
1
2
:
Suppose for example that each candidate announces the median of the state where
he has an advantage. Then the assumption implies that, no matter what the belief
of the voters is, both candidates have a positive probability of winning the election.
The assumption simplies our analysis considerably because it ensures that in all
situations we need to consider the realization of  matters.
Our rst result shows that in any revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) the
candidates converge to the median position of the true state.
Theorem 5.2 In any revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) the candidate strategies
are
(x^L(L); x^L(H)) = (x^H(L); x^H(H)) = (xmL ; x

mH
):
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Proof. Let (x^L(L); x^L(H)); (x^H(L); x^H(H)) be the candidate strategies in a
revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1). At least one of the candidates must an-
nounce di¤erent policies in the two states. Suppose that x^L(L) 6= x^L(H) (the case
x^H(L) 6= x^H(H) is analogous). If x^H(L) 6= xmL then Candidate H can win with a
higher probability in state L by deviating to a position x 6= x^H(H) that is closer
to xmL than x^
H(L) (by (R1) the voter will still be sure that the state is L). Thus
we must have x^H(L) = xmL . Similarly we get x^
H(H) = xmH . And then we can
use the same argument for Candidate L to get x^L(L) = xmL and x^
L(H) = xmH .2
Our next step is to nd the set of parameter values for which a revealing
equilibrium satisfying (R1) exists. The following result shows that there is a cut-
o¤ value of  such that a revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) exists if and only if
the voter signal is at least as informative as this cut-o¤ value.
Theorem 5.3 There exists a revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) if and only if
  R;
where
R =
1
2
+

2( +D)
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that R is increasing in  and
lim
!0
R =
1
2
:
Thus we see that if the di¤erence-in-quality parameter  increases then the elec-
torate has to be better informed in order to make the candidates reveal their
information. The intuition behind this observation is that the higher  is the more
costly (in terms of probability of winning) it is for the disadvantaged candidate to
reveal the state relative to not revealing the state. Therefore, when  increases the
new cut-o¤ value of  must make it more costly for the disadvantaged candidate
not to reveal, i.e. it must be higher. We also see that when the di¤erence in
candidate quality vanishes then there exists a revealing equilibrium no matter how
little information the electorate has.
Also note that R is decreasing in D: So when the median positions of the
two states are further apart then a revealing equilibrium exist for less informed
electorates. The reason is that a higher D makes it more costly not to reveal
relative to revealing for the disadvantaged candidate. The good news from this
observation is that when the state of the world really matters for policy choice (i.e.
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D is high) then it takes less voter information to make the candidates reveal the
true state by converging to the median.
We end this section with a remark on the equilibrium voter belief function used
in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Remark 5.4 In the proof of Theorem 5.3 the equilibrium belief function satises
^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) = 1 and ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; h) = 0:
So if the disadvantaged candidate deviates to the median of the false state then
voters overinfer from their signal. Suppose we require that voters should instead
be Bayesians in this case, i.e. that
^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) =  and ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; h) = 1  :
Then, by mimicking the proof of Theorem 5.3, we get that a revealing equilibrium
satisfying (R1) exists if and only if
  1
2
+
1
2
r

 +D
:
Compared to R the new cut-o¤ value is strictly larger but has qualitatively the
same dependence on  and D.
6 Non-Revealing Equilibria
We will only consider non-revealing equilibria that are symmetric in the following
sense.
Denition 6.1 (Symmetry) Consider a non-revealing equilibrium where Can-
didate L announces x^L and Candidate H announces x^H . It is symmetric if
jx^L   xmL j = jx^H   xmH j and jx^L   xmH j = jx^H   xmL j:
Note that the symmetry condition is equivalent to
x^L + x^H
2
=
xmL + x

mH
2
:
Also note that when x^L is specied, then so is x^H .
In the following result we nd all possible symmetric non-revealing equilibria
and the parameter values for which they exist. Remember that we still make the
assumption that  +D < 1
2
.
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Theorem 6.2 Let x^L, x^H be any pair of policy announcements satisfying the sym-
metry condition. Then the following statements hold.
1. Suppose jx^L   xmL j < . Then:
(a) If xmL  x^L  xmH then x^L, x^H are equilibrium announcements if and
only if
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (x^L   xmL)
 + (x^H   x^L) ;
(b) If x^L < xmL then x^
L, x^H are equilibrium announcements if and only if
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (xmL   x^L)
 +D
;
(c) If x^L > xmH then x^
L, x^H are equilibrium announcements if and only if
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (x^L   xmL)
  D :
2. Suppose jx^L xmL j  . Then x^L, x^H are equilibrium announcements if and
only if x^L   x^H =  and   D (this is independent of the value of ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
An immediate consequence of the theorem above is that a symmetric non-
revealing equilibrium always exists. If D <  then it follows from statement 1.(a)
that there exists an equilibrium with x^L = xmH and x^
H = xmL for   1. If   D
then it follows from statement 2. that, independent of the value of , there exists
an equilibrium with x^L   x^H = .
The abundance of non-revealing equilibria (even with the symmetry restriction)
makes it natural to ask if some of them can be eliminated by a suitable renement
condition. In signalling games the most commonly used renement condition is
the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)). For non-revealing equilibria in our
model the Intuitive Criterion puts the following restrictions on out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. Consider a non-revealing equilibrium x^L, x^H , ^L and a deviation by Candi-
date L to some x. Suppose we are allowed to change the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
and that by doing so we can make the deviation protable if and only if the state
is L (H). Then we must have
^L(x; x^
H ; l) = ^L(x; x^
H ; h) = 1
(^L(x; x^
H ; l) = ^L(x; x^
H ; h) = 0):
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Analogous restrictions are put on the belief function in out-of-equilibrium situa-
tions where Candidate H deviates.
Unfortunately, as we will now show, the Intuitive Criterion does not eliminate
any of the symmetric non-revealing equilibria of our model.
Theorem 6.3 All symmetric non-revealing equilibria satisfy the Intuitive Crite-
rion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
One way to eliminate many of the symmetric non-revealing equilibria is to
introduce a monotonicity condition on the voter belief function. The content of
the condition is that if one candidate moves to a position that is closer to xmL
(xmH ) but not closer to x

mH
(xmL) then L (1  L) does not decrease.
Denition 6.4 (Monotonicity Condition (M1)) A voter belief function L
satises condition (M1) if the following condition holds. Suppose
jx  xmL j  jy   xmL j and jx  xmH j  jy   xmH j:
Then, for all z 2 X, !V 2 fl; hg,
L(x; z; !
V )  L(y; z; !V ) and L(z; x; !V )  L(z; y; !V ):
There is no directly state-dependent cost for the candidates that can justify
this condition (because they are purely o¢ ce-motivated). Nevertheless it does
seem appealing for voters to think that if one candidate moves closer to e.g. xmL
and not closer to xmH then state L is not less likely to be true.
It is worth noting that only considering equilibria that satisfy (M1) (i.e. the
voter belief function satises (M1)) does not change our result on existence of
revealing equilibria. More precisely the conclusion from Theorem 5.3 still holds
if we require revealing equilibria to satisfy (R1) and (M1). This is easily seen by
checking that the equilibrium belief function used in the proof satises (M1).
In the following result we nd the candidate announcements that are possible
in symmetric non-revealing equilibria satisfying (M1).
Theorem 6.5 The candidate announcements in any symmetric non-revealing equi-
librium satisfying (M1) must satisfy
x^L  xmL and xmH  x^H :
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Proof. See the Appendix.
It is easily checked that for x^L, x^H satisfying x^L  xmL and xmH  x^H the
beliefs used in the proof of Theorem 6.2 satisfy (M1). Therefore we can directly
use this theorem to nd out when the di¤erent symmetric non-revealing equilibria
satisfying (M1) exist. The following corollary sums up the most important results.
Corollary 6.6 There exists a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium satisfying (M1)
if and only if
  N ;
where
N =
1
2
+
1
2
r

 +D
:
Furthermore, for any   N there exists a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium
satisfying (M1) with
x^L = xmL and x^
H = xmH :
From Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 6.6 it follows that for all parameter values
either a revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1) or a symmetric non-revealing equi-
librium satisfying (M1) exists. We also see that for some parameter values both
types of equilibria exist.
Corollary 6.7 For all ;D;  > 0 with  +D < 1
2
we have that
R =
1
2
+

2( +D)
<
1
2
+
1
2
r

 +D
= N :
So for all parameter values there exists either a revealing equilibrium satisfying
(R1) or a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium satisfying (M1). Furthermore, both
types of equilibria exist for all s in an interval of non-zero length.
Finally note that N is equal to the cut-o¤ value for existence of revealing
equilibria satisfying (R1) and the extra condition from Remark 5.4. So with that
extra condition on revealing equilibria we still have the existence result from the
corollary, but we only have co-existence of the two types of equilibria when  = N .
7 Discussion
We have analyzed how electoral competition works under the following conditions:
 Candidates are better informed than voters, but voters have some private
information;
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 Candidates are purely o¢ ce-motivated;
 Candidate quality is state-dependent.
Our most important insight was that if the electorate is su¢ ciently well in-
formed then there exists a revealing equilibrium and the policy outcome of such
an equilibrium is the median position in the true state of the world. If the elec-
torate is not su¢ ciently well informed then only non-revealing equilibria exist and
in any such equilibrium there is a possibility that the policy outcome is not the
median position in the true state. Thus our analysis emphasizes the importance of
voters being well informed. It is important to note that voters do not need to be
fully informed for electoral competition to function as if they were fully informed.
The result that candidates will reveal the true state only if the electorate is suf-
ciently well informed could be called "The Matthew Principle of Information":
Those who already have good information shall know the truth, but those who do
not shall be lied to1.
Another interesting feature of our model is that policy divergence is possible
in (non-revealing) equilibrium. Thus we see that candidates being better informed
than voters and state-dependent candidate quality can lead to policy divergence
even when candidates are purely o¢ ce-motivated. As far as we know this is a new
potential explanation of policy divergence in electoral competition (see e.g. section
III in the review paper by Osborne (1995) for other explanations).
8 References
1. Ansolabehere, S. D. and Snyder, Jr., J. M. (2000). Valence Politics and
Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models, Public Choice 103: 327-336.
2. Aragonès, E. and Palfrey, T. R. (2002). Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian
Model with a Favored Candidate, Journal of Economic Theory 103: 131-161.
3. Aragonès, E. and Palfrey, T. R. (2005). Electoral Competition Between
Two Candidates of Di¤erent Quality: The E¤ects of Candidate Ideology and
Private Information. In D. Austen-Smith and J. Duggan (Editors), Social
Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Je¤rey S. Banks (pp.
93-112). Springer.
4. Cho, I-K and Kreps, D. (1987). Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105: 179-221.
1This was suggested by my fellow Ph.D. student Thomas Markussen.
57
5. Cukierman, A. and Tommasi, M. (1998). When Does It Take a Nixon to Go
to China?, The American Economic Review 88: 180-197.
6. Groseclose, T. J. (2001). A Model of Candidate Location When One Can-
didate Has a Valence Advantage, American Journal of Political Science 45:
862-86.
7. Harrington, Jr., J. E. (1993). Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and
Elections, The American Economic Review 83: 27-42.
8. Martinelli, C. (2001). Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters,
Public Choice 108: 147-167.
9. Osborne, M. J. (1995). Spatial Models of Polictical Competition under Plu-
rality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates
and the Positions They Take, The Canadian Journal of Economics 28: 261-
301.
10. Roemer, J. E. (1994). The Strategic Role of Party Ideology When Voters are
Uncertain About How the Economy Works, The American Political Science
Review 88: 327-335.
11. Schultz, C. (1996). Polarization and Ine¢ cient Policies, The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 63: 331-343.
9 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 5.3.
First we show that   R ) existence.
Consider a belief function ^L satisfying
^L(x

mL
; x; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= xmH ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x

mH
; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= xmL ; !V = l; h;
^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) = 1; L(x

mL
; xmH ; h) = 0;
^L(x

mH
; x; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= xmL ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x

mL
; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= xmH ; !V = l; h;
^L(x

mH
; xmL ; l) = 1; L(x

mH
; xmL ; h) = 0:
We claim that such a belief function together with the candidate strategies
(x^L(L); x^L(H)) = (x^H(L); x^H(H)) = (xmL ; x

mH
)
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satises the equilibrium conditions and (R1). First note that the belief function
satises Bayesrule on the equilibrium path and (R1). Thus we just have to check
the optimality of each candidates strategy. First consider the strategies in state
L. Using (R1) it follows that none of the candidates can gain by deviating to a
x 6= xmH . Thus we just have to check that neither candidate can protably deviate
to xmH .
In equilibrium Candidate L wins with probability 1
2
+  and Candidate H
wins with probability 1
2
  . If Candidate L deviates to xmH then his probability
of winning is
(
1
2
+ (  D)) + (1  )( 1
2
  (  D)) = 1
2
+ (2   1)(  D) < 1
2
+ :
So that is never a protable deviation. If Candidate H deviates to xmH then his
probability of winning is
(
1
2
  ( +D)) + (1  )( 1
2
+ ( +D)) =
1
2
  (2   1)( +D):
Thus the deviation is not protable if
1
2
  (2   1)( +D)  1
2
  :
This inequality is equivalent to
  R:
By symmetry it follows that if no candidate can gain from any deviation in
state L, then that is also the case in state H. Thus the equilibrium conditions are
satised if   R.
Finally we show that existence )   R.
Suppose there exists a revealing equilibrium satisfying (R1). We know from
Theorem 5.2 that the candidate strategies must be
(x^L(L); x^L(H)) = (x^H(L); x^H(H)) = (xmL ; x

mH
):
Two necessary conditions for equilibrium are that Candidate H cannot gain by
deviating to xmH in state L and that Candidate L cannot gain by deviating to
xmL in state H. Let ^L be the equilibrium belief and dene
^lL = ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; l) and ^
h
L = ^L(x

mL
; xmH ; h):
Then the necessary conditions can be written
(
1
2
+ ^lL( +D)  (1  ^lL)( +D))
+ (1  )( 1
2
+ ^hL( +D)  (1  ^hL)( +D)) 
1
2
  
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and
(
1
2
+ (1  ^hL)( +D)  ^hL( +D))
+ (1  )( 1
2
+ (1  ^lL)( +D)  ^lL( +D)) 
1
2
  :
Thus it su¢ ces to show that if both the two inequalities above are satised then
we have   R. By adding the two inequalities and a bit of algebra we get
(^lL   ^hL)(2   1)( +D)  :
Thus we see that ^lL > ^
h
L and then it follows that
(2   1)( +D)  
(^lL   ^hL)
 :
Rearranging this inequality we get   R.2
Proof of Theorem 6.2.
1.(a). First we show that   1
2
+ 1
2
q
 (x^L xmL )
+(x^H x^L) ) existence.
Consider a belief function ^L satisfying
^L(x^
L; x^H ; l) =  and ^L(x^
L; x^H ; h) = 1  ;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 1 for all x 6= x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0 for all x 6= x^L; !V = l; h:
We will show that this belief function supports x^L, x^H as an equilibrium. By
symmetry it su¢ ces to show that CandidateH does not have a protable deviation.
It is easily seen that this is the case if deviating to xmL in state L is not protable.
In state L Candidate Hs equilibrium probability of winning is
1
2
  (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
By deviating to xmL in state L Candidate H wins with probability
1
2
  (   (x^L   xmL)):
Thus the deviation is not protable if
1
2
  (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L))  1
2
  (   (x^L   xmL)):
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This inequality is satised if
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (x^L   xmL)
 + (x^H   x^L) :
Then we show that existence )   1
2
+ 1
2
q
 (x^L xmL )
+(x^H x^L) .
Let ^L be the equilibrium belief function. Dene
^lL = ^L(x^
L; xmL ; l) and ^
h
L = ^L(x^
L; xmL ; h):
If Candidate H deviates to xmL in state L he wins with probability
1
2
+ (1  2^lL)(   (x^L   xmL)) + (1  )(1  2^hL)(   (x^L   xmL)):
No candidate can protably deviate so we must have
1
2
+ (1  2^lL)(   (x^L   xmL)) + (1  )(1  2^hL)(   (x^L   xmL))
 1
2
  (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
Since the left hand side is decreasing in ^lLand ^
h
L the inequality still holds if we
replace these numbers by 1s, i.e.
1
2
+ (   (x^L   xmL)) 
1
2
  (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
From this inequality we easily get
  1
2
+
1
2
s
   (x^L   xmL)
 + (x^H   x^L) :
1.(b). The proof is analogous to the proof of 1.(a).
1.(c). The proof is analogous to the proof of 1.(a).
2. First we show that if x^L   x^H =  and   D then x^L, x^H are equilibrium
announcements. Consider a voter belief function ^L satisfying
^L(x^
L; x^H ; l) =  and ^L(x^
L; x^H ; h) = 1  ;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 0 for all x < x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x^
L; x; !V ) = 1 for all x > x^H ; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 0 for all x < x^L; !V = l; h;
^L(x; x^
H ; !V ) = 1 for all x > x^L; !V = l; h:
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Obviously Bayesrule is satised on the equilibrium path. Thus we just have to
show that no candidate can protably deviate. In equilibrium each candidate wins
with probability 1
2
in each state. It is easily seen that if a candidate deviates in
some state then he wins with a probability that is strictly smaller that 1
2
. There-
fore we have an equilibrium.
Finally we show that if x^L  x^H 6=  or  > D then x^L, x^H are not equilibrium
announcements.
First suppose that  > D. If x^L, x^H are equilibrium announcements then
in state L Candidate H wins with a probability strictly less than 1
2
(remember
that jx^L   xmL j  ). But no matter what voters out-of-equilibrium belief are
Candidate H can win with a probability of at least 1
2
by deviating to xmL . Thus
x^L, x^H are not equilibrium announcements.
Then suppose that x^L   x^H 6=  and   D, but for now disregard the special
case x^L   x^H >  and  = D which is handled later. If x^L, x^H are equilibrium
announcements then we have that in each state one of the candidates wins with
probability strictly greater than 1
2
. Consider the state where Candidate L wins
with probability greater than 1
2
. It is straightforward to check that if Candidate
H deviates to the position x given by
x^L   x =  if x^L > xmL ;
x = xmL if x^
L < xmL
then he wins with a probability of at least 1
2
no matter what the votersout-of-
equilibrium beliefs are. Thus x^L, x^H are not equilibrium announcements.
Finally consider the special case x^L  x^H >  and  = D. Each candidate wins
with probability 1
2
in each state. But, in each state, by deviating to xmL Candidate
H can win with a probability stricly greater than 1
2
no matter what the voters
out-of-equilibrium beliefs are. Thus x^L, x^H are not equilibrium announcements.
2
Proof of Theorem 6.3.
Let x^L, x^H , ^L be a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium. Consider a deviation
by Candidate L to a position x. If we want to change the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
such that the probability of winning for Candidate L after the deviation is maximal
then we should choose 0L such that
0L(x; x^
H ; l) = 0L(x; x^
H ; h) = 1
or
0L(x; x^
H ; l) = 0L(x; x^
H ; h) = 0:
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Which of these equations that should be satised depends on x^H and x but not on
the state. Hence we see that Candidate Ls maximal probability of winning after
the deviation is independent of the state. In equilibrium Candidate L wins with
a probability p  1
2
if the state is L and 1   p if the state is H. So if x can (by
changes in the belief function) be made a protable deviation for Candidate L in
state L then the same is true in state H. Similarly we get that if x can be made a
protable deviation for Candidate H in state H then the same is true in state L.
Therefore the Intuitive Criterion does not eliminate the equilibrium if
^L(x; x^
H ; l) = ^L(x; x^
H ; h) = 0 for all x 6= x^L
and
^L(x^
L; x; l) = ^L(x^
L; x; h) = 1 for all x 6= x^H :
All equilibrium announcements in part 1. of Theorem 6.2 are supported by such
beliefs (see the proof). That is not true for the equilibrium announcements in part
2. of the theorem. But for those equilibrium announcements each candidate wins
with probability 1
2
in both states. Therefore the Intuitive Criterion does not put
any restrictions at all on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. 2
Proof of Theorem 6.5.
Suppose x^L, x^H , ^L is a symmetric non-revealing equilibrium satisfying (M1)
with x^L > xmL . We split the proof into two cases, x^
L  xmH and x^L > xmH .
If x^L  xmH then in state L Candidate L wins with probability
1
2
+ (2   1)2( + (x^H   x^L)):
If Candidate L deviates to xmL then, by using that ^L satises (M1), we get that
he wins with a probability of at least
1
2
+ (2   1)2( + (x^H   xmL)):
Since x^L > xmL we have x^
H   xmL > x^H   x^L and thus the deviation is protable.
That is a contradiction.
If x^L > xmH then in state L Candidate L wins with probability
1
2
+ (2   1)2(  D):
Suppose Candidate L deviates to the position x satisfying xmH   x = x^L   xmH .
Then Candidate L has moved closer to xmL and not closer to x

mH
. And then it fol-
lows by (M1) that his probability of winning has increased. That is a contradiction.
2
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Abstract
In this paper we formulate and analyze a simple dynamic model of the
interaction between terrorists and authorities. Our primary aim is to ana-
lyze how the introduction of a so called copycat e¤ect inuences behavior
and outcomes. We rst show that our simple model of terrorist cells im-
plies that an increase in anti-terrorism makes it more likely that cells will
plan small rather than large attacks. Furthermore, we see that an increase
in anti-terrorism can make a terrorist attack more likely. Analyzing the
problem of optimal anti-terrorism we see that the introduction of a copycat
e¤ect rationalizes an increase in the level of anti-terrorism after a large at-
tack. Using this result we show how the copycat e¤ect changes the dynamic
pattern of terrorism attacks and what the long run consequences are.
Keywords: Terrorist Cells, Optimal Anti-Terrorism, Copycat E¤ect, Dy-
namic Pattern of Terrorism.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we formulate and analyze a simple dynamic model of the interaction
between terrorists and authorities. The primary aim of the paper is to analyze how
the introduction of a so called copycat e¤ect inuences behavior and outcomes.
We say that a copycat e¤ect exists if terrorist cells are more likely to be formed
after a period with a high level of terrorism (for example a large attack) than after
a period with low terrorist activity. There are several good reasons to expect that
a copycat e¤ect exists. Media attention to terrorism is higher when there has been
a lot of terrorist activity in the recent past. Therefore the possibility of becoming a
terrorist is more salient for potential terrorists. Furthermore, the increased media
attention means that even relatively minor terrorist acts get a lot of publicity.
Therefore it becomes more attractive to form a terrorist cell and thus it is likely
that more cells are formed.
In our model a terrorist cell lives for one period only and its sole decision is
whether to plan a small or a large attack. Planning a large attack is more risky
because it requires more planning and therefore involves a higher risk of being rolled
up by the authorities. The di¤erence in risk between the two types of attacks is
increasing in the authoritiesspending on anti-terrorism. Therefore it follows that
if the authorities increase the level of anti-terrorism then a cell is more likely to
plan a small attack. The e¤ect of an increase in anti-terrorism on the probability
that a cell will be succesful in making an attack (small or large) is ambiguous. It
can be the case that increased spending on anti-terrorism makes a terrorist attack
more likely.
In each period of time a terrorist cell is formed with some probability. The
aim of the authorities is to minimize the sum of (discounted) expected damage
from terrorism and anti-terrorism costs over all periods by choosing the level of
anti-terrorism in each period. The horizon is innite. We solve for optimal anti-
terrorism in two cases. First we consider a benchmark case where the probability
of a cell being formed is the same in all periods. Then we move on to a case where
a copycat e¤ect is in play. More specically we assume that the probability of
a cell being formed is higher if there was a large attack in the previous period.
We show that the authorities choose a higher level of anti-terrorism after a large
attack. Using that result we see that if a cell is formed then the probability of
a small attack is highest and the probability of a large attack and the expected
damage is lowest after a large attack. Finally, we compare long run distributions
for the benchmark case and the copycat case. In the long run the copycat e¤ect
implies more anti-terrorism, more small attacks and a higher per period sum of
terrorism damage and anti-terrorism costs. On the other hand it implies less large
attacks and less damage from terrorism.
A substantial number of papers have studied economic and game theoretic
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models of the interaction between terrorists and authorities. For a review see for
example Sandler and Enders (2004). Among the specic problems that have been
studied are terrorists choice of targets (see e.g. Sandler and Lapan (1988)), hostage
taking (Lapan and Sandler (1988)), substitutions by terrorists after policy changes
(Enders and Sandler (1993)), the choice between proactive and defensive countert-
errorism measures (Rosendor¤ and Sandler (2004)), and the e¤ect of concessions
to terrorists (Bueno de Mesquita (2005)). We are not aware of papers studying
the implications of copycat e¤ects. Furthermore, our model is distinct from most
of the literature because it is dynamic (with innite horizon), although it should
be noted that the dynamic structure is very simple because terrorist cells live for
one period only. Another dynamic model is Faria (2003).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. Then we
consider the behavior of the terrorist cells in Section 3 and the problem of optimal
anti-terrorism in the two cases in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss our
results and some ideas for further research.
2 The Model
In each period of time t = 0; 1; 2; ::: a terrorist cell is formed with probability
t 2 (0; 1]. A cell lives for one period only and its only decision is whether to plan
a small or a large attack (it can only make one attack). If the cell formed in period
t succeeds in making a small attack then the damage is D > 0. If the cell succeeds
in making a large attack then the damage is
D(1 + "t);
where "t is drawn from a probability distribution on [0;1) with cumulative dis-
tribution function F . The realization of "t is known to the cell when it makes its
decision. We assume that F (0) = 0 and that F (") < 1 for all ". Furthermore
we assume that F is di¤erentiable on [0;1) such that it has the density function
f = F 0.
The authorities choose a level a 2 [0;1) of anti-terrorism in each period. The
level of anti-terrorism in some period t, at, decides how likely it is that a cell
formed in period t is rolled up before it attacks if the cell plans a large attack. If
the cell plans a small attack then the probability that it is rolled up is zero. While
this is hardly realistic it is a simple way of modelling that a cell preparing a small
attack is less likely to be rolled up because a small attack requires less planning.
Formally, if the cell decides to plan a large attack then the probability that is
rolled up before the attack is p(at), where p : [0;1) ! [0; 1] is a di¤erentiable
and strictly increasing function satisfying p(0) = 0. The level of anti-terrorism is
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known to the cell when it makes its decision. We assume that the cell maximizes
expected damage. Therefore the cell plans a small attack if
D > (1  p(at))D(1 + "t)
and a large attack if we have the opposite inequality. If the cell is indi¤erent then
we assume that it plans a small attack.
The aim of the authorities is to minimize the sum of discounted expected
damages and anti-terrorism costs by choosing the level of anti-terrorism in each
period. The discounting rate of the authorities is  2 (0; 1). The cost of anti-
terrorism is given by a di¤erentiable and strictly increasing function c : [0;1) !
[0;1) with c(0) = 0.
The timing of events and decisions in period t is as described in the list below. It
is important to note that when the authorities decide on the level of anti-terrorism
they know t and F but they do not know whether a cell will be formed and what
the realized value of "t will be in that case. rt denotes the damage from terrorism
in period t.
Timing of events and decisions in period t:
1. The authorities decide on at and pays the cost c(at);
2. A new cell is formed with probability t;
3. If a cell was formed then the value of "t is realized and the cell decides on
what kind of attack to plan;
4. If a cell was formed and planned a small attack then it launches its attack
() rt = D);
5. If a cell was formed and planned a large attack then it is rolled up with
probability p(at) () rt = 0);
6. If a cell was formed, planned a large attack and was not rolled up then it
launches its attack () rt = D(1 + "t)).
In the following we rst take a closer look at the behavior of the terrorist cells
and its consequences. Then we move on to the problem of optimal anti-terrorism.
We will focus on two cases. First, we consider a benchmark case where in each
period the probability of a new cell being formed does not depend on actions or
events in previous periods. Secondly, we consider a case where a copycat e¤ect is
in play, i.e. it is more likely that a cell is formed in the current period if there was
a large terrorist attack in the previous period than if there was not. Finally, we
compare the copycat case to the benchmark case.
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3 The Behavior of the Terrorist Cells
Suppose that in some period t the authorities choose the level of anti-terrorism a.
Furthermore suppose that a cell is formed. As noted above the cell plans a small
attack if (and only if)
D  (1  p(a))D(1 + "t):
Thus the probability that the cell launches a small attack is
Pr(D  (1  p(a))D(1 + "t)) = Pr("t  ") = F (");
where
" =
1
(1  p(a))   1 =
p(a)
(1  p(a)) :
Note that
@"
@a
=
p0(a)
(1  p(a))2 > 0
which implies
@F (")
@a
=
@"
@a
f(") > 0:
Thus we see that an increase in the level of anti-terrorism makes it more likely that
the cell will make a small attack. The probability of the cell succesfully launching
a large attack is
(1  p(a))(1  F (")):
Since p0 > 0 and @F ("
)
@a
> 0 this expression is decreasing in a, so an increase in
a makes a large attack less likely. Adding the two probabilities above we get the
probability that the cell launches some kind of attack (i.e. the probability that it
is not rolled up):
P (a) = F (") + (1  p(a))(1  F (")) = 1  p(a)(1  F (")):
We see that
@P
@a
=  p0(a)(1  F (")) + p(a)@"

@a
f(")
The rst term arises from as e¤ect on the probability of the cell being rolled up.
This term is obviously negative. The second term arises from as e¤ect on the
cells decision about what kind of attack to plan. An increase in a makes it more
likely that the cell will plan a small attack which decreases the probability that it
is rolled up. Thus this term is positive. Generally we cannot say which of the two
e¤ects that dominates, it depends on the functions p and F and the value of a.
Below we show by an example that an increase in the level of anti-terrorism can
make a terrorist attack more likely. That is an interesting observation.
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Consider the following simple example:
p(a) =
a
1 + a
;
F (") = 1  exp( "):
Then we have
" =
a
(1 + a)(1  a
1+a
)
= a
and
f(") = exp( "):
Thus the probability of the cell making an attack is
P (a) = 1  a
1 + a
exp( a)
and hence we have
@P
@a
=
exp( a)
(1 + a)2
(a(1 + a)  1):
Loosely speaking, for small levels of a an increase in the level of anti-terrorism
makes a terrorist attack less likely and for large levels of a we have the opposite
e¤ect. More precisely, @P
@a
is negative for as below the positive root of a(1+ a)  1
and positive for as above this root.
4 Optimal Anti-Terrorism
In this section we consider the problem of the authorities. First, we consider
our benchmark case where, for each t, t (the probability of a cell being born in
period t) does not depend on what has happened in earlier periods. In that case
the authoritiesproblem is just a sequence of independent static problems which
are easy to solve. Secondly, we introduce a simple type of copycat e¤ect which
makes the authorities problem truly dynamic. We solve this problem by dynamic
programming. Finally, we compare the two cases.
4.1 The Benchmark Case
In this case the level of anti-terrorism chosen in some period t does not inuence the
problem of the authorities in future periods. Thus in each period the authorities
simply choose the level of anti-terrorism that minimizes the sum of the expected
damage from the cell possibly formed in that period and the cost of anti-terrorism.
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Consider the authorities problem in period t. For simplicity we suppress sub-
script ts such that we write , a and " instead of t, at and "t. The expected
damage from a cell formed in period t is
(a) = F (")D + (1  F ("))(1  p(a))D(1 + E["j" > "]):
Note that
E["j" > "] =
R1
" f(")d
1  F (") :
We can write the problem of the authorities as
min
a2[0;1)
(a);
where
(a) = (a) + c(a):
Since p, c and F are di¤erentiable so is . The rst order condition for an interior
solution is
0(a) = 0;
which can also be written
c0(a) =  0(a):
This is a simple "marginal cost equals marginal benet" equation. The left hand
side is of course the marginal cost of anti-terrorism. The right hand side is minus
the marginal e¤ect of anti-terrorism on the expected damage from terrorism. By
di¤erentiating  and collecting terms (see the Appendix for details) we see that
the condition can be written as
c0(a) = p0(a)(1  F ("))D(1 + E["j" > "]):
Under some additional assumptions on the functions p and c the solution to the
authorities problem is unique, interior and the only solution to the rst order
condition.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose p and c are twice di¤erentiable and that we have the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. p0(0) > 0, c0(0) = 0 and lima!1 c0(a) =1;
2. p00  0 and c00 > 0.
Then there is a unique solution to the authorities problem and it is interior and
the only solution to the rst order condition.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
If the conditions in the theorem are satised then we let a denote the unique
solution to the authorities problem. By using the Implicit Function Theorem on
the rst order condition it is easily seen that a is a di¤erentiable function of  and
that
@a
@
> 0
(simply note that @
0
@
< 0 and, by the proof of Theorem 4.1, 00(a) > 0). So if the
probability of a cell being formed is increased then the authorities will choose a
higher level of anti-terrorism. This immediately implies that the probability of a
small attack,
F ("(a));
is increasing in  (remember that " increases with the level of anti-terrorism). We
cannot generally say in which direction the probability of a large attack,
(1  F ("(a)))(1  p(a));
changes when  increases. The same is true for the sum of the two probabilities and
for the expected damage, (a). Note, however, that conditional on a cell being
formed we have that the probability of a large attack and the expected damage
from terrorism are decreasing in . Conditioning on a cell being formed does not
change the result that the probability of a small attack is increasing in  or the
fact that we cannot determine in which direction the probability of some kind of
attack changes when  increases.
As an example of functions satisfying the conditions in Theorem 4.1 we can
take the example of p from the previous section and c(a) = a2. If we again
let F (") = 1   exp( ") then the rst order condition for optimal anti-terrorism
becomes
2a  exp( a)
(1 + a)2
(2 + a)D = 0:
4.2 Introducing a Copycat E¤ect
Now we introduce a simple type of copycat e¤ect. More specically we assume
that t is higher if there was a large terrorist attack in period t   1 than if there
was not. To model the copycat e¤ect dene the variable x at time t as
xt =

s if rt 1  D
l if rt 1 > D

:
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So xt = s (for small) if the damage from terrrorism was at most D in period t  1.
If the damage was higher than D in period t  1 then xt = l (for large). We then
let t depend on xt and assume that
t(s) < t(l);
which reects the copycat e¤ect. We furthermore assume that t(s) and t(l) does
not depend on t. Thus we can write
t(s) = 
s < l = t(l) for all t.
Having modelled the copycat e¤ect it is obvious that the level of anti-terrorism
chosen in period t inuences the probability that a cell is born in period t + 1
because it inuences rt and thus xt+1. Therefore the authorities must solve a
truly dynamic problem in order to nd their optimal level of anti-terrorism in each
period. We solve the problem by dynamic programming.
The Bellman equation for the dynamic programming problem can be written
as
V (x) = inf
a2[0;1)
[(a; x) + (P (s; x; a)V (s) + P (l; x; a)V (l))];
where
(a; x) = x(a) + c(a)
and
P (x0; x; a) = Pr(xt+1 = x0jxt = x; at = a) for all x; x0 2 fs; lg:
Note that the Bellman equation is a little non-standard because the transition
probabilities depend on a. Writing the transition probabilities in detail we get
P (l; x; a) = x(1  p(a))(1  F ("))
and
P (s; x; a) = 1  P (l; x; a)
= 1  x(1  p(a))(1  F ("))
for all x 2 fs; lg, a 2 [0;1). By plugging in the transition probabilities the
Bellman equation becomes
V (x) = inf
a2[0;1)
[(a; x) + x(1  p(a))(1  F ("))(V (l)  V (s)) + V (s)]:
Lemma 4.2 There exists a unique solution V to the Bellman equation above. It
satises V (s) < V (l).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, for each x 2 fs; lg, consider the problem
min
a2[0;1)
[(a; x) + (P (s; x; a) V (s) + P (l; x; a) V (l))]:
Pairs of solutions to these two minimization problems are solutions to the dynamic
programming problem of the authorities. In the theorem below we present an
existence and uniqueness result. For simplicity we dene
g(a; x) = (a; x) + (P (s; x; a) V (s) + P (l; x; a) V (l)):
Theorem 4.3 Suppose the assumptions from Theorem 4.1 are satised, that F is
twice di¤erentiable, and that
@2
@a2
F (") =
@
@a
(
@"
@a
f("))  0:
Then, for each x 2 fs; lg, there is a unique solution to the problem considered
above and it is interior and the only solution to the rst order condition
@
@a
g(a; x) = 0
Furthermore, letting a+(x) denote the optimal level of terrorism in state x we have
a+(s) < a+(l):
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result that authorities choose a higher level of anti-terrorism when x = l
than when x = s is perhaps not surprising but it does have some interesting
implications. Consider the probability of a small attack as a function of x. This
probability is
xF ("(a+(x)))
and thus it is highest when x = l. So if there was a large attack in the previous
period then there is a higher probability of a small attack than if there was not.
This is also true if we instead consider the probability of a small attack conditional
on a cell being born, which is of course equal to F ("(a+(x))). The probability of
a large attack as a function of x is
x(1  p(a+(x)))(1  F ("(a+(x)))):
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We cannot generally say whether this function is highest when x = s or when
x = l. However, note that the probability of a large attack conditional on a cell
being formed is highest when there was not a large attack in the previous period.
With respect to the expected damage from terrorism, x(a+(x)), we again cannot
say whether it is highest when x = s or when x = l. But conditional on a cell
being born it is highest when there was not a large attack in the previous period.
Finally, note that the per period sum of damage from terrorism and anti-terrorism
costs,
(a; x) = x(a+(x)) + c(a+(x));
is highest when x = l. This follows from the observation that (a; s) is increasing
for a  a+(s), which follows easily from Theorem 4.4 in the following section.
Now we will consider the problem of nding the long run distribution of x when
the authorities behave optimally. Dene
Q(x0; x) = P (x0; x; a+(x)) for all x0; x 2 fs; lg
and note that
Q(x0; x) 2 (0; 1) for all x0; x 2 fs; lg:
These transition probabilities denes a map Q on the set of probability distribu-
tions on fs; lg into itself by
(Q)(x0) = Q(x0; s)(s) +Q(x0; l)(l); x0 2 fs; lg:
Dene  by
(s) =
Q(s; l)
1 Q(s; s) +Q(s; l) :
It is easily seen that  is the unique xed point for Q and that (Q)t !  for
any . Hence  is the unique stationary distribution of x and for any distribution
of x0 the distribution of xt converges to . Therefore we conclude that the long
run distribution of x is given by . Of course  then determines the long run
distribution of the level of anti-terrorism and all functions thereof.
Finally we return briey to the example of p, F and c considered earlier. Since
F is twice di¤erentiable and
@2
@a2
F (") =
@2
@a2
(1  exp( a)) =   exp( a) < 0
we have that the conditions in Theorem 4.3 are satised. For each x the rst order
condition for optimal anti-terrorism is
2a  x exp( a)
(1 + a)2
(2 + a)D   x[exp( a)
(1 + a)2
(2 + a)]( V (l)  V (s)) = 0;
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which can be simplied to
2a  x exp( a)
(1 + a)2
(2 + a)(D + ( V (l)  V (s))) = 0:
By comparing with the rst order condition from the benchmark case we see that
in each state the authorities behave as if they were in a case where there is no
copycat e¤ect and D is replaced by D + ( V (l)  V (s)).
4.3 Comparing the Two Cases
Consider the authoritiesproblem with and without the copycat e¤ect in some
period t. Suppose that  = xt, i.e. that the probability of a new cell being
formed is the same whether or not there is a copycat e¤ect. Then the following
result shows that the authorities will choose a strictly higher level of anti-terrorism
if the copycat e¤ect is present. Note that we still assume that the assumptions in
Theorem 4.3 (which include the assumptions in Theorem 4.1) are satised.
Theorem 4.4 If  = x then
a < a+(x):
Proof. By the rst order conditions for the two cases we have that
0(a) + c0(a) = 0
and
x0(a+(x)) + c0(a+(x)) > 0:
Since  = x and (a) + c(a) is convex it follows that a < a+(x). 2
The intuition behind this result is the following. With the copycat e¤ect the
authorities do not only consider the sum of expected damage and anti-terrorism
costs in the present period, they also take into account that raising the anti-
terrorism level makes it less likely that a cell will be formed in the following period.
Thus the marginal benet from anti-terrorism is higher with the copycat e¤ect and
therefore a higher level is chosen.
From the result it follows easily that if we are in a period with  = xt then
the probability of a small attack is higher with the copycat e¤ect than without it.
On the other hand the probability of a large attack and the expected damage from
terrorism is lower with the copycat e¤ect (note, however, that the sum of damages
and costs is higher with the copycat e¤ect).
Ultimately we want to compare long run distributions for the two cases. The
problem with this is how to choose the parameters , s and l in order to get
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meaningful comparisons. We do it the following way. Fix s and l and suppose
that in each period the probability of a cell being formed in the benchmark case is
 =

s with probability (s)
l with probability (l)

;
where  is the long run distribution of x from the copycat case. The realization
of  is known to the authorities when they choose the level of anti-terrorism. We
dene  this way to ensure that the long run distributions of the probability of a
cell being formed are the same in the benchmark and the copycat case. Thus any
di¤erence between the two cases does not arise because of di¤erences in these long
run distributions.
We say that a variable (e.g. the level of anti-terrorism or the expected damage
from terrorism) is higher in the long run with (without) the copycat e¤ect if the
long run distribution of the variable with (without) the e¤ect strictly rst order
stochastically dominates the long run distribution without (with) the e¤ect. Note
that this implies that the long run average of the variable is higher with (without)
the e¤ect. With this denition we have the following results.
Theorem 4.5 Assuming  is distributed as described above the following state-
ments hold.
1. The level of anti-terrorism is higher in the long run with the copycat e¤ect.
2. The probability of a small attack (r = D) is higher in the long run with the
copycat e¤ect.
3. The probability of a large attack (r > D) is higher in the long run without
the copycat e¤ect
4. The expected damage from terrorism is higher in the long run without the
copycat e¤ect.
5. The sum of expected damage and anti-terrorism costs is higher in the long
run with the copycat e¤ect.
Proof. When  is distributed as described above then any variable v depending
on the level of anti-terrorism is higher in the long run with (without) the copycat
e¤ect if and only if
v(a+(x))  v(a(x)) for each x 2 fs; lg
(  )
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with strict inequality for at least one x. Using that observation all conclusions
follow easily from Theorem 4.4. 2
It is worth noting that we cannot generally say whether the long run probability
of some kind of attack (r > 0) is highest with or without the copycat e¤ect.
5 Discussion
Using our simple model of terrorist cells we saw that an increase in the level of anti-
terrorism makes it more likely that a cell will make a small attack and less likely
that it will make a large attack. The probability that a cell makes some kind of
attack (which is equal to the probability that it is not rolled up by the authorities)
can change in either direction. This is an interesting observation - spending more
on anti-terrorism may increase the probability of a terrorist attack. Suppose that
there has just been a terrorist attack and that the authorities increase the level
of anti-terrorism only to try to calm down the public. This e¤ort can have the
e¤ect that another terrorist attack becomes more likely! Note, however, that an
increase in the level of anti-terrorism always decreases the expected damage made
by a terrorist cell.
By analyzing the problem of optimal anti-terrorism we saw that the existence of
a copycat e¤ect o¤ers a rational choice explanation of why authorities increase the
level of anti-terrorism after a large attack. Therefore, when a copycat e¤ect exists
a terrorist cell formed after a large attack is more likely to make a small attack and
less likely to make a large attack. This implies that after a large attack there is a
larger probability of a small attack. But, because of the increased likelihood of a
cell being formed, it does not necessarily imply that there is a smaller probability
of a large attack. By the same argument we have that while the expected damage
made by a terrorist cell is smaller after a large attack, the a priori expected damage
from terrorism may be higher.
In our comparison of the copycat case and the benchmark case we saw that the
long run distribution of several variables di¤ers systematically in the two cases.
With the copycat e¤ect there is more anti-terrorism, more small attacks and a
higher sum of damages and costs while there is less large attacks and less damage.
Note that the benchmark case is the better one for the authorities because the
sum of damages and costs are lower.
The way we dene the copycat e¤ect is evidently stylized. Instead of assuming
that t is a piecewise constant function of rt 1 with a jump at D it would be
more desirable to assume only that it is some increasing function of rt 1. That
would, however, also make the model more technically challenging to analyze. Our
intuition tells us that a model with a more realistic assumption on ts dependence
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on rt 1 would give results that are qualitatively similar to ours. Still, it would be
nice to see the analysis of such a model carried out.
The copycat e¤ect is introduced exogenously into the model. As we have
mentioned earlier there are good reasons for assuming that a copycat e¤ect exists.
Nevertheless, it would be desirable to have a model where the copycat e¤ect follows
endogenously from the dynamic interaction between terrorists and authorities (and
perhaps the public and the media). This is an interesting direction for further
research.
A di¤erent way of rationalizing that authorities increase the anti-terrorism level
after a large attack is to assume that such an attack reveals information that the
authorities use to update beliefs. For example, it could be information about the
number of existing cells, the probability that a cell is formed during some period of
time, or the striking capabilities of existing or new cells. Modelling this is another
possible direction for further research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of 0(a) =  p0(a)(1  F ("))D(1 + E["j" > "]).
First write (a) as
(a) = F (")D + (1  F ("))(1  p(a))D + (1  p(a))D
Z 1
"
f(")d:
By di¤erentiation we get
0(a) =
@"
@a
f(")D   @"

@a
f(")(1  p(a))D   p0(a)(1  F ("))D
  p0(a)D
Z 1
"
f(")d  (1  p(a))D@"

@a
"f("):
By collecting terms we then get
0(a) =  p0(a)(1  F ("))D(1 + E["j" > "])
+
@"
@a
f(")D(1  (1  p(a))(1 + ")):
Since " = 1
(1 p(a))   1 it follows that the last term is equal to zero and thus we are
done. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
First note that it su¢ ces to show that
0(0) < 0; lim
a!1
0(a) =1 and 00 > 0:
We know that
0(a) = c0(a)  p0(a)(1  F ("))D(1 + E["j" > "]):
Thus we have
0(0) = c0(0)  p0(0)(1  F (0))D(1 + E["j" > 0])
= c0(0)  p0(0)D(1 + E["]):
And then it follows from the two rst assumptions in 1: that 0(0) < 0. Now
rewrite 0 as
0(a) = c0(a)  p0(a)(1  F ("))D   p0(a)D
Z 1
"
f(")d:
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By that expression and the assumption that p00  0 we see that
0(a)  c0(a)  p0(a)D(1 + E["])
 c0(a)  p0(0)D(1 + E["])
Using that inequality it follows from the last assumption in 1: that lima!1 0(a) =
1. By di¤erentiating 0 we get
00(a) = c00(a)  p00(a)(1  F ("))D(1 + E["j" > "])
+ p0(a)
@"
@a
f(")D(1 + "):
By our assumptions the rst term is strictly positive and each of the last two terms
are non-negative. Thus we have 00 > 0. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.2.
Dene the map T from the set of real functions on fs; lg (which can be identied
with R2) into itself by
(Tf)(x) = inf
a2[0;1)
[(a; x) + (P (s; x; a)f(s) + P (l; x; a)f(l))]:
It is easily checked that T satises Blackwells su¢ cient conditions for a contraction
(see e.g. Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem 3.3, p. 54). And then it follows by
Banachs Fixed Point Theorem / The Contraction Mapping Theorem (see e.g.
Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem 3.2, p. 50) that there exists a unique V such
that
T V = V :
Furthermore we have T nf ! V for all f .
To show V (s) < V (l) it su¢ ces to show that, for any f ,
f(s)  f(l)) (Tf)(s) < (Tf)(l):
Because then we can pick such an f to get
V (s) = lim
n
(T nf)(s)  lim
n
(T nf)(l) = V (l)
and thus
V (s) = (T V )(s) < (T V )(l) = V (l):
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Suppose f(s)  f(l). Then we have
(Tf)(l) = inf
a2[0;1)
[(a; s) + (P (s; s; a)f(s) + P (l; s; a)f(l))
+ (l   s)(a) + (l   s)(1  p(a))(1  F ("))(f(l)  f(s))]:
From this equation we see that
(Tf)(l)  inf
a2[0;1)
[(a; s) + (P (s; s; a)f(s) + P (l; s; a)f(l))] + (l   s) inf
a2[0;1)
[(a)]
= (Tf)(s) + (l   s) inf
a2[0;1)
[(a)]
and since infa2[0;1)[(a)] = D it then follows that
(Tf)(l) > (Tf)(s):
2
Proof of Theorem 4.3.
First note that to prove the rst statement of the theorem it su¢ ces to show
that, for each x 2 fs; lg,
@
@a
g(a; x)ja=0 < 0; lim
a!1
@
@a
g(a; x) =1 and @
2
@a2
g(a; x) > 0:
By di¤erentiation we get (after collecting some terms)
@
@a
g(a; x) =
@
@a
(a; x)
+ x[ p0(a)(1  F ("))  (1  p(a))@"

@a
f(")]( V (l)  V (s)):
By plugging in a = 0 and using Theorem 4.1 we get
@
@a
g(a; x)ja=0 < @
@a
(a; x)ja=0 < 0:
Since p00  0 and @
@a
(@"

@a
f("))  0 it follows that the term
p0(a)(1  F (")) + (1  p(a))@"

@a
f(")
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is bounded. By Theorem 4.1 we have lima!1 @@a(a; x) = 1 and thus we can
conclude that
lim
a!1
@
@a
g(a; x) =1:
By di¤erentiation of @
@a
g(a; x) we get
@2
@2a
g(a; x) =
@2
@2a
(a; x)
+x[ p00(a)(1 F ("))+2p0(a)@"

@a
f(") (1 p(a)) @
@a
(
@"
@a
f("))]( V (l)  V (s)):
By our assumptions the term in the square brackets is non-negative and by The-
orem 4.1 we have @
2
@2a
(a; x) > 0. Thus we see that
@2
@a2
g(a; x) > 0:
To prove the last statement of the theorem note that
@
@a
g(a; l) =
@
@a
g(a; s)
+ (l   s)[0(a)  ( V (l)  V (s))(p0(a)(1  F (")) + (1  p(a))@"

@a
f("))]:
Since the term in the square brackets is negative we have
@
@a
g(a; l) <
@
@a
g(a; s):
Therefore
@
@a
g(a; l)ja=a+(s) <
@
@a
g(a; s)ja=a+(s) = 0:
And then it easily follows by the convexity of g(a; l) that
a+(s) < a+(l):
2
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Abstract
We introduce the notion of group based regret in collective action sit-
uations. When regret is group based an individual feels regret if she and
members of the group of people with similar preferences could have im-
proved the outcome by acting di¤erently. This is di¤erent from "rational
regret", where rational means that regret is only felt if the individual herself
could have improved the outcome. We show that in two specic examples
of collective action situations individuals contribute more if they are group
based regret minimizers rather than payo¤ maximizers or rational regret
minimizers.
Keywords: Regret, Collective Action, Voting, Binary Public Goods.
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1 Introduction
The outcome of the 2000 US presidential election was decided when Bush was
certied as the winner in Florida. His o¢ cial margin of victory was 537 votes.
Consider a potential voter in Florida who preferred Gore over Bush but for some
reason did not vote. What was her state of mind when it became clear that Bush
had won the election? Did she regret not voting? If regret is "rational" in the
sense that an individual only feels regret if she couldpersonally have improved
the outcome by choosing di¤erently then the answer is no. Even though Bushs
margin of victory in Florida was remarkably slim, one extra vote for Gore would
not have changed anything. However, it is not given that the feeling of regret is
so closely linked to the observation of whether she as an individual could have
changed the outcome. In this paper we hypothesize that an individual feels regret
after a realized outcome of a collective action situation if she and members of the
group of people with similar preferences could have changed the outcome. If that is
true then the voter would have felt regret because she and just 537 other abstaining
Gore supporters in Florida could have given Gore the victory by turning out to
vote. In a CBS News/New York Times national post-election poll (CBS and NYT
(2000)) 55% of non-voters answer that given the closeness of the election they wish
they had voted. The poll was done well before the o¢ cial result from Florida was
known and the reliability of such a poll is obviously questionable in many ways.
Nevertheless it does suggest that regret was widespread among non-voters after
the 2000 election and thus that regret is not always rational in the sense described
above.
In individual decision making people often take into account the regret they
will feel after an outcome is realized (see e.g. Zeelenberg (1999)). Therefore it is
reasonable to believe that this is also the case when individuals decide what to do
in collective action situations. However, if regret is rational then it is unlikely that
it can lead to costly participation in collective action situations where the action of
one individual is very unlikely to make a di¤erence, e.g. large elections. But if an
individual can feel regret even though she could not personally have changed the
outcome then it is entirely possible that anticipating this regret can lead to costly
participation. Consider the example from above. Suppose the voter knows that
if she does not vote and it turns out that abstaining Gore supporters in Florida
could have tipped result of the election (not a very unlikely event) then she will
feel regret. In that case she may prefer to avoid the risk of feeling this regret by
turning out to vote even though it is costly.
In this paper we analyze some examples of collective action situations under the
assumption that people are regret minimizers. As mentioned above we will assume
that the regret of an individual is based on what she and members of the group of
people with similar preferences could have achieved if they had acted di¤erently.
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We refer to this as group based regret. While this type of regret obviously di¤ers
from rational regret (as dened above) it is still completely determined by what
did happen, what realistically could have happened and the individuals payo¤s in
those situations. Also, it is not asymmetric in the sense that individuals can only
regret non-participation in collective action. Suppose an individual has contributed
to a binary public good and it turns out that the good is provided and would have
been so even without her contribution. Then she regrets her contribution just as
she would have if regret was rational.
The results from our examples show that we get more participation when peo-
ple minimize group based regret than when they minimize rational regret or are
standard payo¤ maximizers. Even though our examples are very simple they do
indicate that when we observe over-participation in collective action (relative to
the prediction of individual payo¤maximization), group based regret is a possible
explanation.
The role of regret in the decision to vote or not has been studied by Ferejohn
and Fiorina (1974) and Li and Majumdar (2007). Ferejohn and Fiorina uses the
minimax regret criterion (due to Savage) to analyze the voting decision. That
means that each voter makes the choice that minimizes the maximal regret that
she can come to feel when an outcome is realized. With reasonable parameter
values a voter will feel more regret if she did not vote and would have been pivotal
than if she voted and was not pivotal. When that is the case the voter will choose
to vote for her preferred candidate. Invoking the minimax regret criterion has been
criticized (see e.g. Beck (1975) and Mayer and Good (1975)) because it is only
reasonable when the voting decision is taken without any knowledge about the
probability of being pivotal, i.e. under uncertainty rather than under risk. While
voters may have quite limited knowledge about the probability of being pivotal it
is reasonable to believe that they do know it is very small in large elections.
Li and Majumdar studies a game theoretic model where potential voters vote
if their anticipated regret of abstaining is higher than the voting cost. Since their
model assumes a continuum of voters their notion of regret is clearly not rational
(the decision of a single voter does not have any impact on the outcome). Also
note that regret is asymmetric in the sense that only abstaining voters feel regret
and that abstainers feel regret even if their preferred candidate wins. Thus their
notion of regret clearly di¤ers from our notion of group based regret. It is assumed
that regret is decreasing in the margin of victory and that abstainers feel more
regret if their preferred candidate looses than if he wins. The authors prove the
existence of a unique equilibriumwith positive turnout and nd comparative statics
results that t well with stylized facts. For example, turnout increases with the
importance of the election.
We are not aware of other papers that directly explores the link between regret
and collective action. In the eld of individual decision theory under risk models
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based on anticipated regret/rejoice has been studied. The rst of these were Bell
(1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider the collective action
situation of voting in large elections. We take a simple decision theoretic approach.
Then, in Section 3, we look at the provision of a binary (discrete) public good. We
study this collective action situation from a game theoretic perspective. Finally
we discuss and conclude in Section 4.
2 Voting in Large Elections
Consider an election with two candidates (1 and 2) and a large number of voters.
We will analyze the decision whether to vote or not for an individual who prefers
Candidate 1 over Candidate 2. Let N1 denote the number of people preferring
Candidate 1 (excluding the individual under consideration) and let N2 denote the
number of people supporting Candidate 2. Furthermore let Vi, i = 1; 2, denote the
number of people (other than the individual under consideration) who turns out
to vote for candidate i. When our individual makes her decision by maximizing
expected payo¤ or minimizing rational regret there are four scenarios that she has
to take into consideration:
 S1 : V1 > V2;
 S2 : V1 = V2;
 S3 : V1 = V2   1;
 S4 : V1 < V2   1:
In the scenarios two and three the individual is pivotal, in scenarios one and four
she is not. Let her payo¤ be one if Candidate 1 wins and zero if Candidate 2 wins.
A tie gives her a payo¤ of one half. The voting cost is c > 0. The payo¤ and
rational regret for voting and abstaining in each of the four scenarios are given in
the following table.
S1 S2 S3 S4
Payo¤, voting 1  c 1  c 1
2
  c  c
Payo¤, abstaining 1 1
2
0 0
Rat. regret, voting c maxfc  1
2
; 0g maxfc  1
2
; 0g c
Rat. regret, abstaining 0 maxf1
2
  c; 0g maxf1
2
  c; 0g 0
Suppose that c < 1
2
(otherwise voting would be dominated by abstaining). Let pi,
i = 1; 2; 3; 4, denote the individuals belief about the probability of scenario i. If
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our individual is an expected payo¤ maximizer then she votes if
p1 + p2 +
p3
2
  c > p1 + p2
2
;
i.e. if
p2 + p3 > 2c:
If she is a rational regret minimizer then she votes if
(p1 + p4)c < (p2 + p3)(
1
2
  c);
i.e. if
p2 + p3 > 2c:
Thus we see that if the individual is an expected payo¤ maximizer or a rational
regret minimizer then she votes if (and only if) the probability of being pivotal is
greater than two times the cost of voting. In large elections that means that the
individual will vote only if her cost of voting is essentially zero.
Now suppose that our individual is a group based regret minimizer. More
precisely this means the following:
1. Her regret after some outcome is realized is given by the maximal payo¤ she
could have gotten if she and other members of the group of Candidate 1
supporters had acted di¤erently minus her realized payo¤;
2. She takes the action that minimizes her expected regret.
In this case some of the scenarios considered above has to be split into sub-
scenarios. Scenario three has to be split into two sub-scenarios and scenario four
has to be split into three sub-scenarios:
 S3A : V1 = V2   1 and N1 = V1;
 S3B : V1 = V2   1 and N1 > V1;
 S4A : V1 < V2   1 and N1 < V2   1;
 S4B : V1 < V2   1 and N1 = V2   1;
 S4C : V1 < V2   1 and N1 > V2   1:
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In S3A and S3B our individual can make the election a tie if she votes. But they are
di¤erent because in S3B there are abstainers who prefer Candidate 1 while that is
not the case in S3A. So if our individual abstains in scenario S3B then she and the
other abstainers preferring Candidate 1 could have given him the victory by voting.
That is not the case in scenario S3A simply because there are no other abstainers
in the group of Candidate 1 supporters. In a similar way the sub-scenarios of S4
di¤ers in the number of Candidate 1 supporters that abstain.
The group based regret for voting and abstaining in each of the seven scenarios
are given in the following table. Note that we assume c < 1
2
.
S1 S2 S3A S3B S4A S4B S4C
Group b. regret, voting c 0 0 0 c 0 0
Group b. regret, abstaining 0 1
2
  c 1
2
  c 1  c 0 1
2
  c 1  c
We see that a group based regret minimizer votes if
(p1 + p4A)c < (p2 + p3A + p4B)(
1
2
  c) + (p3B + p4C)(1  c);
i.e. if
p2 + p3A + p4B + 2p3B + 2p4C > 2c:
In a large election it is reasonable to believe that the probabilities p2, p3A, p3B and
p4B are essentially zero. In that case the voting condition becomes
p4C > c:
p4C is the probability that, excluding the considered individual, Candidate 2 gets
at least two more votes than Candidate 1 but if all supporters of Candidate 1 had
voted then he would have gotten at least a tie. So we see that a group based
regret minimizer votes if this probability is greater than the voting cost. There
is no reason to expect that p4C is close to zero in large elections. Therefore we
conclude that group based regret can lead individuals with non-negligible voting
costs to vote in large elections.
3 Provision of a Binary Public Good
In this section we consider a game where a number of individuals simultaneously
decide whether to contribute a xed amount to a public good or not. If a su¢ cient
number (which is common knowledge) of people contribute then the public good
is provided, if not then all contributions are wasted. This type of game has been
analyzed extensively in the literature (see Rapoport (1999) for a review). Here we
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will show how the prediction of behavior and outcomes is changed if individuals are
group based regret minimizers instead of expected payo¤ maximizers or rational
regret minimizers.
Suppose that there are three individuals and that at least two of them have to
contribute for the good to be provided. The contribution cost is c > 0 and the
value of the public good to each individual is r > c. The payo¤ structure is then
summarized by the following pair of tri-matrices where individual 1 chooses a row,
individual 2 chooses a column and individual 3 chooses a matrix. "C" means that
the individual contributes while "NC" means that she does not.
C NC
C r   c; r   c; r   c r   c; r; r   c
NC r; r   c; r   c 0; 0; c
C NC
C r   c; r   c; r  c; 0; 0
NC 0; c; 0 0; 0; 0
C NC
It is easily seen that when individuals are payo¤ maximizers then there are four
pure strategy Nash equilibria. Either exactly 2 individuals contribute or nobody
contributes. We will also consider symmetric mixed Nash equilibria. Suppose all
individuals contribute with probability p 2 (0; 1). That is a mixed Nash equilib-
rium if (and only if) each individual is indi¤erent between contributing and not
contributing, i.e. if
(1  (1  p)2)(r   c) + (1  p)2( c) = p2r:
Simplifying this equation we get
2p(1  p) = c
r
:
If c
r
< 1
2
this equation has two solutions, if c
r
= 1
2
it has one solution and if c
r
> 1
2
it
has no solutions. So there exists a symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium (other than
the pure strategy equilibrium where nobody contributes) if and only if c
r
 1
2
.
When individuals are rational regret minimizers the game can be summarized
by the following pair of rational regret tri-matrices.
C NC
C c; c; c 0; 0; 0
NC 0; 0; 0 r   c; r   c; c
C NC
C 0; 0; 0 c; r   c; r   c
NC r   c; c; r   c 0; 0; 0
C NC
It is easily seen that we get the same pure strategy Nash equilibria as above.
Symmetric mixed Nash equilibria are given by the equation
(p2 + (1  p)2)c = 2p(1  p)(r   c);
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which can be simplied to
2p(1  p) = c
r
:
So with respect to symmetric mixed Nash equilibria we also get the same results
as when the individuals were assumed to be expected payo¤ maximizers.
Now assume that the individuals are group based regret minimizers. All three
individuals belong to the same group. The group based regret for each individual
in each possible outcome is summarized by the following pair of tri-matrices.
C NC
C c; c; c 0; 0; 0
NC 0; 0; 0 r   c; r   c; c
C NC
C 0; 0; 0 c; r   c; r   c
NC r   c; c; r   c r   c; r   c; r   c
C NC
The only change from the rational regret case is in the situation where nobody
contributes. In the rational regret case neither of the individuals could have per-
sonally improved the situation and therefore none of them feel regret. When regret
is group based each individual feels regret in this case because if the individual
herself and at least one of the other two had contributed then she (and the co-
contributor(s)) would have received a payo¤ of r   c instead of a payo¤ of zero.
Suppose r c > c. It is easily seen that in this case there are three pure strategy
Nash equilibria, namely the ones where exactly two individuals contribute. The
strategy prole (NC;NC;NC) is no longer an equilibrium. The group based regret
has destroyed the no-contribution equilibrium and thus the public good is provided
in all of the pure strategy equilibria. If instead r   c  c then we still have the
no-contribution equilibrium.
Next consider symmetric mixed strategy equilibria that are not pure strategy
equilibria (i.e. we disregard the pure no-contribution equilibrium if it exists).
Contribution with probability p 2 (0; 1) is an equilibrium if (and only if)
(p2 + (1  p)2)c = (1  p2)(r   c):
This equation can be simplied to
(1 + (1  p)2)c = (1  p2)r
or
1  p2
p2   2p+ 2 =
c
r
:
By a little more algebra we get
(
c
r
+ 1)p2   (2c
r
)p+ (
2c
r
  1) = 0:
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The solutions of this quadratic equation are
c
r
p ( c
r
)2   c
r
+ 1
c
r
+ 1
It is straightforward to see that if the solutions are real then the largest one is in
(0; 1). So there exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium if (and only if)
 (c
r
)2   c
r
+ 1  0;
i.e. if
c
r
  1 +
p
5
2
 :62:
Furthermore, we see that there are two symmetric mixed strategy equilibria if (and
only if)
0 <  (c
r
)2   c
r
+ 1 < (
c
r
)2;
which is equivalent to
1
2
<
c
r
<
 1 +p5
2
:
Thus there exists only one equilibrium if (and only if)
c
r
 1
2
or
c
r
=
 1 +p5
2
:
Below we show the symmetric mixed equilibria in the group based regret case
(solid) and in the payo¤/rational regret case (dots) as functions of c
r
.
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We see that when we have existence of a symmetric mixed equilibrium in both cases
( c
r
 1
2
) then the probability of contribution is higher in the unique equilibrium
in the group based regret case than in any of the equilibria in the payo¤/rational
regret case. This statement is formally proved in the Appendix.
4 Discussion
In this paper we have introduced the notion of group based regret in collective
action situations. We have seen that in two specic collective action situations
there is more contribution if individuals are group based regret minimizers than if
they are payo¤maximizers (or rational regret minimizers). Our denition of group
based regret and the assumption that individuals sole aim of decision making is to
minimize regret are obviously stylized. It is reasonable to believe that the feeling of
regret is worse when it would have taken the contribution of only a few individuals
to change the outcome than when it would have taken the contribution of many.
For example, after the o¢ cial result of the 2000 US presidential election was known,
an abstaining Gore supporter from Florida was probably more regretful than one
from Ohio (a state that could also have tipped the election), where Bush won with
more than 175,000 votes. Furthermore, it is surely more realistic to assume that
minimization of regret is one aim among others that are taken into account when
an individual makes a decision. Despite all this, our examples do suggest that when
we observe more contribution than predicted by individual payo¤ maximization
then part of the explanation can be that regret is group based and that minimizing
anticipated regret plays a non-negligible role in decision making.
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6 Appendix
Proof of statement from Section 3.
It su¢ ces to show that for all c
r
 1
2
we have
c
r
+
p ( c
r
)2   c
r
+ 1
c
r
+ 1
>
1 +
p
1  2 c
r
2
(note that the right hand side is the largest solution to 2p(1   p) = c
r
). For
simplicity dene k = c
r
. By a little algebra we see that the inequality above is
equivalent to
p k2   k + 1 p 2k + 1
k(1  k) >
1 p k2   k + 1
k(1 + k)
:
The left hand side is the slope of the straight line through the points
( 2k + 1;p 2k + 1) and ( k2   k + 1;
p
 k2   k + 1):
The right hand side is the slope of the straight line through the points
( k2   k + 1;
p
 k2   k + 1) and (1; 1):
Since the square root function is strictly concave it follows that the inequality
holds. 2
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